By: Camilo A. Enciso Vanegas[1]
Introduction
This paper aims to briefly portray the origins, evolution and domestic impact of Plan Colombia from its inception in 1999 until 2013. It also intends to make the case that after the decline of Colombian drug cartels, and especially after 9/11, Plan Colombia has been no just an antinarcotics strategy but also a counterinsurgency tactic. Therefore, after 9/11, the war on drugs and the war on FARC might be seen to some extent as one single effort.
In addition, it intends to assess the geopolitical importance of Plan Colombia by analyzing the regional tensions that its execution created. Moreover, it analyzes the rise of Latin-American Left during the past decades, the concern that its intercontinental alliances might be creating in the US, and its impact over Colombian and US antinarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies. Finally, it shortly evaluates possible development trends of Plan Colombia under Santos-Obama´s Administrations.
The document is divided in four parts, which might me summarized as follows: Part one portrays the situation faced by Colombia in the late 1990´s. It argues that at the time Colombia was seen by the international community as a failed state. In addition, it describes the failure of the peace negotiations held between the Colombian government and FARC in the period 1998-2002. Finally, it asserts that during that time the Administration of President Pastrana launched Plan Colombia, in agreement with the US, thus settling the basis that allowed a reversal of FARC´s advance.
Part two describes the turning point of the counterinsurgency and counternarcotics war in Colombia. It argues that such turning point derived from FARC abuses during the 1998-2002 peace negotiations as well as from the global war on terror led by the US after 9/11 attacks. Plus, it summarizes the main characteristics of Plan Colombia and the efforts made by the Colombian government in such struggle. Further, it provides data that describes the recuperation of public order by the Colombian state, as well as additional achievements in the economic field.
The next part of the document describes the impact of the execution of Plan Colombia in the region. Particularly, it summarizes the growing tension lived between Ecuador and Venezuela, on one side, and Colombia on the other, due to the alleged aid provided by the government of the latter countries to FARC rebels and due to military and police actions performed by Colombian officials in foreign soil.
Further, it assesses the evolution of Latin-American left since 1999 and the growing isolation suffered by Colombia since then. Finally, it contends that the ever closer union between Latin-American left and Middle Eastern and Eastern countries that began during the first years of the initial decade of 21st century poses a threat to the US, which sees Colombia as its dearest, closest and lonely ally in the hemisphere.
The fourth part of the essay is a short chapter summarizing the “Colombian comeback” as an influential regional player after President Juan Manuel Santos took office in 2010. It also portrays the reduction of US aid in Colombian antidrug and counterinsurgency actions. Nonetheless, it argues that the US will maintain providing aid to Colombia to some extent, given Colombia´s geopolitical importance and the menace of the growing influence of Middle Eastern and Eastern countries in the region.
The last part contains a small description of the peace negotiations currently held by the government with FARC rebels in La Habana, as well as its implications for the future of Plan Colombia and US aid in the war against drugs and crime in Latin-America.
1. In Search For Peace: Trick or Treat
Colombia: ¿Failed State?
During the 1980´s and 1990´s Colombia was seen by the international community as a failed state. Unemployment, inflation and poverty were at its highest levels in decades; more than 3.5 million Colombians had fled their homes due to rural violence; drug cartels, paramilitaries, corrupt public officials and army officers had extended their power beyond imagination; and coca-leaf plantations were growing at a steady pace[2].
Further, the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC) had taken control of a vast portion of the Colombian territory. Nearly 120 Colombian majors had been forced to govern from the capitals of corresponding Colombian Provinces (Departamentos) due to the pressure of organized crime in the municipalities for which they had been elected.
Also, Colombian military and police forces had suffered catastrophic defeats in the hands of FARC rebels: as of December 21, 1997, FARC successfully took over Patascoy, a military base located between the provinces of Nariño and Putumayo, a strategic region for organized crime due to the abundance of coca-leaf plantations in the area. Such attack evidenced the attempt of FARC to control a business that had been managed by Medellin and Cali drug cartels alone, whose power had declined since the killing of Pablo Escobar in Medellin in 1993, and the arrest and conviction of Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela and his brother Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela in 1995.
As of August 3, 1998, four days before President Pastrana took office, 1000 FARC rebels successfully occupied the military-police base located in Miraflores, thus defeating the largest Colombian antinarcotics headquarter of the time[3]. Finally, as of November 1, 1998, Colombian military and police suffered an additional strike. Mitú, the capital of the Province of Vaupés, was put under FARC control for 2 days, after 1500 rebels took over the city[4]. Colombian fracture was apparent. Something needed to be done.
Thus, while the Colombian State under President Samper (1994-1998) was suffering astounding defeats on the hands of FARC rebels, upcoming elected President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) began dialogues with their leaders in order to begin peace negotiations under his mandate.
Caguan Peace Negotiations: The Empty Seat
By means of Resolution 85 of October 14 of 1998, Pastrana’s government created a “Peace Zone”, in which no military or police officials would be allowed. The Peace Zone was composed by the municipalities of La Uribe, Mesetas, La Macarena and Vista Hermosa, in the Province of Meta, and of San Vicente del Caguan, in the province of Caquetá, reaching a total of 42,000 square kilometers.
A couple of months later, Manuel Marulanda Vélez – FARC´s historical leader – and President Andrés Pastrana agreed to meet in a public event to be held on January 7, 1999, meant to serve as the public kickoff ceremony of the peace dialogues. Marulanda did not attend the meeting, alleging security reasons. Thus, from day one of the peace negotiations, President Pastrana was publicly humiliated by FARC rebels. Marulanda’s empty seat was the forewarning of what the negotiations to come would be like.
In spite of the guarantees granted by the Colombian government, FARC rebels kept advancing a powerful military agenda for more than three years while hypocritically holding peace dialogues with Pastrana´s government. They used the Peace Zone to hold kidnapped persons, produce and export cocaine, and enhance their military power. Only in February 21, 2002 the peace process was unilaterally terminated by President Pastrana, after 3 years and 4 months of unfruitful dialogue, and after myriads of military and terrorist actions perpetrated by FARC.
However, Pastrana had a Plan B. Since his election, Pastrana had developed an aggressive diplomatic agenda with the US, the European Union and other countries, in search of foreign support for Colombian peace process and war against drugs. He had probably concluded that in view of FARC´s growing military power, the only way to force such organization to negotiate peace would be to cut off its main source of financing: drugs.
While the EU withdrew from supporting the Plan, the US was receptive to President´s Pastrana requests. The US and Colombia structured Plan Colombia as far as 1999 as an integrated strategy aimed at defeating the narcotics industry, promoting the peace process, rescuing Colombian economy and strengthening democracy.[5] It is noteworthy that Plan Colombia was seen by FARC and some left wing organizations and thinkers as a strategy to intensify counterinsurgency, to deepen American imperialism and neoliberal policies[6], and to broaden social inequalities, all of which portrayed a lack of real governmental will of peace.[7] As mentioned in the Introduction above, this article likewise claims that defeating counterinsurgency was one of Plan Colombia´s main goals from its inception.
In spite of its critics, Plan Colombia was initially structured as a 7.5 billion US dollars plan. President Pastrana pledged 4 billion US dollars and asked the international community to pledge 3.5 billion US dollars in addition.[8] In years 1999 and 2000, the Clinton Administration asked Congress to approve a 1.6 billion US dollars package for that purpose, which would be disbursed in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Finally, a 1.3 billion package was approved.[9]
Most part of the resources would be spent in 5 different strategic lines: first, improving governing and judicial capacity, as well as respect for human rights (108 M); second, expansion of counter-narcotics operations into southern Colombia (631 M); third, alternative economic development (220 M); fourth, increased interdiction in Colombia and the region (386 M); and fifth, assistance for the Colombian national police (96 M).[10]
2. Turning Point
The War on Terror
NATO´s war-on-terrorism-agenda after 9/11 attacks over the Pentagon and Manhattan´s World Trade Center, the rupture of peace dialogues between Pastrana´s government and FARC in February 2002, the election of Alvaro Uribe as President in 2001 and his taking of office in August 2002, were the turning points of the war. In addition, in 2002 US Congress granted expanded new statutory authorities, making US assistance to Colombia more flexible, in view of the recognition that terrorism and the illicit narcotics trade were allegedly inextricably intertwined.[11]
Thereafter, Colombia as a whole would radicalize in its struggle against FARC. Only a few skeptics remained aside from the unanimity that gathered around Uribe´s “Democratic Security” policy. Uribe´s popularity remained at an average of 74% favorable opinion during his two-terms mandate, and reached a 91% peak as of July 10, 2008, a couple of days after the liberation of Mrs. Ingrid Betancourt.[12]
Uribe took advantage of the Plan Colombia-Road paved by Pastrana´s Administration: The training and equipping of two Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions, the acquisition of fourteen UH-60 BlackHawk helicopters for the Army's Counternarcotics Brigade and two UH-60 BlackHawk helicopters for the National Police, thirty-three UN-1N helicopters provided by the supplemental as interim lift for the Brigade, nine additional Huey II helicopters for the National Police, and all necessary conversion kits, communications equipment, infrastructure and weapons, began to prove useful.[13]
In addition, a contract for five additional spray planes had been signed in February 8, 2002, including an option for four more. Delivery of those aircraft began in the summer of 2002, when Uribe first took office. The US also aided refurbishing and modifying three OV-10D airplanes to further supplement the spray fleet. Also, the first of the Colombian Air Force's upgraded intercept aircraft – made to interdict airborne trafficking shipments – was delivered in 2002.[14]
Colombian War Tax Policy
In exercise of extraordinary powers, by means of Decree 1838 of August 11, 2002, the Colombian government created the Democratic Security Tax, which sought to increase the country´s military budget. Later, as of December 12, 2006, Congress passed the government´s War Tax Initiative, which aimed to secure additional resources to finance war against FARC.[15]
The levy of those taxes allowed the acquisition of 25 Super Tucano-Embrear firefighters, at a cost of 234 million USD. Such aircraft, with capacity to strike rebel ground forces, were delivered to the Colombian government from 2006 till 2008.[16] In addition, the collected funds permitted an increase of 40,000 additional soldiers and antinarcotics policemen, thus reaching a total of 340,000 men.[17]
Finally, in 2009 Congress passed again an approval to collect the War Tax again for that year and yearly until 2014.[18] Thus, it is apparent that tax paid by Colombians has strongly contributed to the turnaround of the dynamics of war.
Plan Colombia´s Achievements (1999-2006)
The rapid improvement of Colombian military/police air fleet and ground troops had a very significant impact on the development of the war. By 2004, 5 years after the beginning of Plan Colombia, Plan Colombia combined with Uribe´s Security strategy allowed government presence in all of the country's 1,099 municipalities (county seats), for the first time in recent history.
The National Planning Department issued in 2006 a full report that assessed the impact of Plan Colombia and that confirmed the improvements mentioned in the paragraph above. Said report concluded:
“Hence 1999 Colombia has witnessed significant changes, particularly during the past 4 years, such as the reduction of violence and the restoration of security, which reflected in the reduction of homicides, abductions and massacres; the increase in the territorial control due to the presence of the Public Force in all the urban zones of the Colombian municipalities; the reduction of coca leaf plantations (…); the increase of economic growth near a 5% GDP; and the achievements made in the improvement and access to the judicial system, as well as the protection and promotion of human rights and international humanitarian law”.[19]
According to official numbers, extortive abductions lowered 85.4%, from 2,587 in 1999 to 378 in 2005 per year; homicide lowered 33.3%, from 58.6 per 100,000 habitants in 1999 to 39.1 per 100,000 habitants in 2005; and massacres lowered 71.4%, from 168 in 1999 to 44 in 2005.[20] Regarding illicit plantations, they were reduced from 163,300 hectares in year 2000 to 86,300 in 2003[21], and 85,750 in 2005.[22]
Concerning interdiction, apprehension of cocaine increased from 43,633 Kilograms in 1999 to 169,889 Kilograms in 2005.[23] Regarding destruction of coca production labs, such operations increased from 287 in 1999 to 1967 in 2005.[24] Finally, during the same term, 428 persons were extradited by Colombia to the US, rising from 10 persons extradited in1999 to 139 in 2004 and 122 in 2005.[25]
Other significant aspect directly related to the evolution of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency activities performed under Plan Colombia was the economic progress after 1999. Colombia GDP grew from -4.2% in 1999 to 5.1% in 2005. Also, the unemployment rate showed a positive evolution, lowering from 16.5% in 2000 to 11.8% in 2005.[26]
Finally, Colombian exports to the US also increased, rising from 2.9 Billion USD in 1999 to 8.4 Billion USD in 2005, particularly due to the impact of the ATPDEA Agreement – a unilateral US policy meant to grant Colombian products with preferential tariffs – adopted in view of Colombian antidrug policy efforts.
Such positive developments continued during the following years.
The Evolution of Plan Colombia (2006-2010)
President Uribe was reelected by Colombians for the term 2006-2010. As of 2007, his government presented a new strategy under the name of National Consolidation Plan, which aimed to consolidate the gains achieved under Plan Colombia. The strategy meant to establish state presence in historically ungoverned territories, by improving access to housing, health, education, justice, democracy, and by providing economic development. Since 2007 and until 2009, approximately 570 M USD were invested in socio economic and humanitarian assistance. Further, in November 17, 2009, the US and Colombia signed a new country assistance agreement with first year funding of 212 M USD.[27]
The National Consolidation Plan was partly successful. Economic growth trends remained undamaged and even improved during those years. Unemployment decreased from a 15.52% high in 2002 to an 11.79% low in 2010. GDP reached 6.7% in 2006, 6.9% in 2007, 3.5% in 2008, 1.7% in 2009, and 4.3% in 2010[28].
Also, in the field of coca-leaf plantations the numbers improved. In 2005, Colombia had 85,750 hectares cultivated with coca leaf. In 2007 they lowered to 77,870 hectares. Next year they increased to 98,899, but during the past years they were reduced at a steady pace. In 2008 the total cultivated area was 81,000; in 2009, 73,000; and in 2010, 62,000.[29] When compared to the 163,000 hectares of 2000, the success is apparent.[30]
However, it must be noted that while Colombia continued to witness these series of successes in the struggle to reduce coca-leaf plantations, the truth of the matter is that the plantations simply migrated to Bolivia and Peru. In a short time, the latter became the world´s second largest coca-leaf and cocaine producer after Colombia.[31]
According to a report released in 2011 by the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC) and the Peruvian government, by 2010 coca-leaf plantations had kept growing for the 5th consecutive year, registering a 2.2% growth and reaching 61,200 cultivated hectares. Nonetheless, such 2.2% growth was the lowest since 2005. Since that year, the growth average had been of 4.5% per year, reaching a 6.8% growth peak in 2009.
Something similar happened with drug cartels and distribution hubs. While interdiction became stronger in Colombia, the importance of the Colombian cartels decreased when compared with Central American and Mexican cartels. Such rise of the Mexican cartels has had catastrophic consequences for Mexico. Approximately 50,000 persons were killed in Mexico from 2006 till 2012, as a result of drug cartel wars.
Thus, it is clear that Colombian success in the war against drugs became Peru´s and Mexico´s failure, not to mention Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. Efforts made by Colombia in the battle against drugs were easily overcome by the narcotics industry by moving its production fields and distribution hubs. Such phenomena could be compared with a sailor´s attempt to impede the sinking of an old ship by putting a finger in one hole, while the rats are opening ten more. As it will be noted in Chapter 4, these facts derived in President´s Santos attempt during the past years to persuade the international community and the US to review traditional antinarcotics policies.
Moving to another terrain, conclusions of the evolution and impact of counterinsurgency activities during the Consolidation Plan period are still unclear. Whereas the Colombian government has kept obtaining astounding military victories with the killing of historical FARC leaders and dismantling some of their main military structures, FARC have transformed their military tactic by creating small Tactic Combat Units, thus avoiding aircraft military operations of the Colombian armed forces and achieving greater mobility and small victories.[32]
Such change in FARC´s operation tactic has permitted the increase of operations against civil and military authorities since 2007. That year, attacks by FARC reached 1057. Next year they increased up to 1353; and kept growing up to 1614 in 2009 and 1947 in 2010, still under the mandate of President Alvaro Uribe.[33]
Moreover, due to the reduction of resources originated by drug trafficking, FARC rebels have found other “innovative” forms of financing, such as micro-extortion, express-abductions, micro-drug-trafficking and smuggling.
2010-2014: Prosperity for All
In 2010, Uribe´s Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos was elected as President for the term 2010-2014, in part due to his achievements and outstanding strikes against FARC top leaders and due to successful military and intelligence operations achieved under his direction, such as the liberation of Ingrid Betancourt in July, 2008.[34]
The evolution of the antinarcotics and counterinsurgency strategy during his first three years of government has been a matter of debate. Paradoxically, two years back from now former President Uribe became the main rival of President´s Santos Administration. Since then Uribe has repeatedly asserted that the antinarcotics and counterinsurgency improvements during his administration have been reversed after he left office.
However, for many the achievements obtained during the final years of President´s Uribe Administration (2006-2010) and the initial years of President´s Santos term (2010-2014) made apparent that Colombia successfully reinstalled public order, restored democracy and obtained significant successes in the antinarcotics and counterinsurgency struggle.
3. Plan Colombia and Latin-American Left Eastern Allies
As it is apparent, Plan Colombia was not created only with the aim of defeating drug trafficking in Colombia. In fact, it also intended to defeat FARC and, as noted above, one of its core components also sought to achieve increased interdiction in the region. For Latin-American left wing governments, such components of Plan Colombia meant a deliberate intent of the US to unduly intrude in Latin-American countries´ sovereignty. Thus, since its inception in 1999 Plan Colombia became a highly debated topic in the region, particularly due to the proliferation of leftist governments since that same year, and due to the – illegal – performance of Colombian military and intelligence activities which affected sovereign rights of third parties.
Latin-America Leans Left
After Hugo Chavez (1999-2001; 2001-2007; 2007-2013) was democratically elected in Venezuela in 1998, many Latin-American countries leaned left: Brazil, under Lula Da Silva (2003- 2006; 2007-2010); Bolivia, under Evo Morales ((2006-2010; 2010-2014); Ecuador, under Rafael Correa (2006-2009; 2009-2013; 2013-2016); Nicaragua, under Daniel Ortega (2006-2011; 2012-2017)[35]; Chile, under Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010); and Argentina, under Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007), and Cristina Fernández (2007-2011; 2011-2015).
Nonetheless, the shadow of the other 9/11, the one of 1973, when the CIA and Chilean military overthrew Salvador Allende from power, was still in the air.[36] For example, as of April 12, 2002, Hugo Chavez´ government was put under pressure, when some sectors of the military aided by US officials rebelled against the President, kidnapped him, and replaced him with Pedro Carmona, who later fled Venezuela for Colombia when military loyal to Chavez retook control. The Colombian government granted Carmona asylum.[37]
Likewise, as of December 13, 2004, Colombian agents detained in Caracas-Venezuela FARC leader Rodrigo Granda. Afterwards, without authorization of Venezuelan authorities, the agents forcefully took him to Colombia, where he was held in custody.[38] Such action was seen by Venezuela as an unacceptable sovereignty breach. President Chavez asked the Colombian government to apologize for its actions, and President Uribe answered in turn that Colombia would not apologize because Venezuela was granting protection to FARC rebels in its territory.
Years after, as of March 1, 2008, a greater incident occurred: Aided by American intelligence, the Colombian government ordered the bombing of a FARC military camp placed in the Ecuadorian side of the Colombo-Ecuadorian border. Raul Reyes, one of the most important historical leaders of that organization and a permanent member of its General Secretariat, was hiding in the camp.[39]
The outcome of the airstrike was the death of Reyes and 17 of his men, the death of 4 students of the National University of Mexico (UNAM), the detention of several persons, and data collection of two computers of Reyes, which later provided evidence of the logistic, economic, and ideological support granted by the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments to the guerrillas.[40] A diplomatic outburst ignited during the following weeks between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. The latter countries mobilized troops to their borders with Colombia, thus creating huge tension in the region.
The Colombian government later argued that (i) the bombing had been a self defense operation of the Colombian military – that had previously been attacked by enemy fire near the Colombo-Ecuadorian border – in compliance with article 51 of the Charter of the UN,[41] (ii) no violation of Ecuadorian airspace had occurred, as the airstrike departed from Colombian airspace into Ecuadorian soil, (iii) Colombian military entered Ecuadorian soil in order to secure the area, until Ecuadorian authorities could arrive to the place, (iv) the Ecuadorian government had been passive with regard to the presence of FARC combatants in its territory, and therefore diplomatic efforts to obtain the detention of Reyes would have been useless, (v) furthermore, ex-post facto evidence found in the computers evinced several meetings held by Ecuador’s Defense Minister Gustavo Larrea with Raul Reyes, that would prove Ecuador’s government support to FARC, and (vi) the need to strike Reyes down, impeding him from engaging in further criminal activity was imminent.
On its side, the Ecuadorian government argued that (i) the Colombian government had infringed Ecuador’s national sovereignty as it had bombed Ecuadorian soil and invaded with infantry Ecuadorian soil, (ii) the attack was under no circumstance an act of self defense, (iii) the required element of imminence was completely lacking, (iv) the Colombian government perpetrated an act of aggression under international law and the Rome Statute, that had resulted in the death of at least one Ecuadorian citizen,[42] (v) the Colombian government infringed international law, breached the right of self defense of the Charter of the United Nations, and put at risk international peace and security in the region, and (vi) violated a long pacific tradition between the two countries.
Even though the dispute ended after significant diplomatic efforts, the truth of the matter is that Colombian actions created an enormous tension in the region, particularly given (a) the affinity between FARC and Hugo Chavez’ (who in April 22, 2010 inaugurated a monument in honor of Manuel Marulanda Velez, FARC´s historical leader[43]), (b) the fact that Colombia’s secret police had entered into Venezuelan soil in 2005, where it (illegally) arrested Raul Granda, former international spokesman of FARC, bringing him back secretly and illegally into Colombian territory, where he was tried and convicted for the crime of rebellion some time after, (c) the fact that several intelligence reports had shown that guerrilla leaders were hiding in Venezuela, counting with Chavez’ acquaintance, and (d) it triggered a multibillion dollar arms race between Venezuela and Colombia.
It is noteworthy that as of September 30, 2010, Rafael Correa´s government also suffered a coup which could finally be reversed. In sight of several precedents, suspicions of a US plot against Correa´s government proliferated throughout the region,[44] particularly given the fact that in 2009 Correa had ended US antinarcotics operations in the Ecuadorian military base of Manta.
Certainly, all of the abovementioned facts progressively isolated Colombia from its Latin-American counterparts. For example, in several occasions since 1999, Venezuela and Ecuador closed their borders to Colombian products due to diplomatic or political disputes. Even more, Colombia began to be seen as the hemisphere´s Israel, particularly after the execution of the Colombo-American military agreement that after November 3, 2009, allowed the US to move its Manta operations to Colombia.[45] Meanwhile, Latin-American socialist countries closed ties and entered into deep economic, social and political cooperation.
Rise of the Bolivarian Dream
In the course of a decade, Latin-American leftist countries structured new pillars of cooperation. For instance, Venezuela and Cuba impulsed in 2004 the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), as a cooperation agreement between Latin-American countries aimed at reducing poverty and economic asymmetries. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, later joined the agreement.
Further, leftist countries strengthened Mercosur by creating the Fund for the Structural Convergence of Mercosur (2004), the Mercosur Parliament (2005), and by the adherence of Venezuela (2006) and Bolivia (2012) to the agreements[46]. Further, they created the Banco del Sur in 2009, which began operations in 2012, with the intention of counting with a South American Central Bank that reduced dependence from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[47]
Finally, along the decade those same countries entered into joint ventures and other type of cooperation agreements in order to lever costly projects in the oil & gas, electricity, infrastructure and education sectors. Accordingly, under Chavez´ leadership, after 4 years of negotiations, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was founded in 2008 with the signature of the Founding Treaty, which came into force in 2011. Colombia joined the treaty as an effort not to be left out of regional policy making.[48]
The efforts of Latin-American leftist countries seemed to be proving fruitful. The economic growth of countries such as Brazil was seen as an example of the capacity of Social Democratic Latin-America to reinvent itself and find new development roads. Moreover, the anticipated payments of external debts by (i) Argentina for 9.8 Billion USD to the International Monetary Fund in 2006[49], (ii) Brazil for 15.5 Billion USD to the IMF, and (iii) Venezuela to its lenders in 2007[50] was a strong signal of the desire of those countries for achieving larger autonomy.
The increasing political and economic autonomy of Hispanic nations was probably seen by the US as a challenge to traditional American hegemony, to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA-ALCA) agenda, to the influence of the OAS and to the principles of the Washington Consensus. Children were playing hardball.
The Eastern Allies
As a final note to this chapter, it is relevant to observe that the rise of Latin-American leftist countries would not have been possible without the aid of additional associates; regional alliances would not suffice. Leftist countries began an aggressive diplomatic agenda in order to deepen alliances with Middle-Eastern and Eastern countries. The new list of allies included countries such as Iran, India, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, China and North Korea. Uni-polarity was coming to an end, and Latin-America was playing an important role in the change of world balance of power. As Zbignew Brzezinski stated in a famous lecture delivered at Columbia University in 2008, after three centuries of Western preeminence, world power was leaning East once again.
To put things in perspective, it is noteworthy that Sino-Venezuelan trade in 1999 did not exceed 500 M USD. A decade later, after a series of cooperation agreements were made between Hugo Chavez and Hu Jintao, bilateral trade reached 7.5 Billion USD in 2009. Such increase made China Venezuela's second-largest trade partner. Further, it made Venezuela China's biggest investment destination in Latin-America. In addition, China offered Venezuela a 20 Billion USD credit line in April 2009, which ought to be repaid in the form of oil shipments to China.[51] Nicaragua also fortified commercial relations with China during the past decade, entering into a Free Trade Agreement with that country, which entered into force in March 2008.[52]
Furthermore, countries such as Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, while openly challenging US power, publicly endorsed Eastern dictatorships of American foes as a means of obtaining additional gain. In a speech delivered in March 2006, President Chavez addressed President George W. Bush Jr. as follows:
"You are ignoramus, you are a burro, Mr. Danger... or to say it to you in my bad English: [switching languages] You are a donkey, Mr. Danger. You are a donkey, Mr. George W. Bush. [Returning to Spanish] You are a coward, a killer, a [perpetrator of] genocide, an alcoholic, a drunk, a liar, an immoral person, Mr. Danger. You are the worst, Mr. Danger. The worst of this planet... A psychologically sick man, I know it."[53]
That same year, British Prime Minister Tony Blair urged Venezuela to abide by the rules of the international community. Chavez replied that Mr. Blair had infringed those very rules by invading Iraq. President Chavez then stated:
"Don't be shameless, Mr. Blair. Don't be immoral, Mr. Blair. You are one of those who have no morals. You are not one who has the right to criticize anyone about the rules of the international community. You are an imperialist pawn who attempts to curry favor with Danger Bush-Hitler, the number one mass murderer and assassin there is on the planet. Go straight to hell, Mr. Blair."[54]
Chavez peers did not step behind. Nicaragua´s President Ortega also delivered loud talk against the US, Colombia and its Western allies. What's more, Ortega has endeavored to achieve a closer relationship with Mahmud Ahmedineyads´ Iran, one of US greatest foes. Iran gladly accepted to strengthen those ties.[55] While the US had stepped Iran´s back yard by making strong military presence in Afghanistan and Irak, Iran´s friendship with Nicaragua, combined with its allegedly effort to build nuclear weapons, became a matter of huge concern for US State Department. This is particularly true, in sight of Ahmadineyads´ repetead statements during the past years, beginning in 2005, when he publicly called Israel a "tumor", echoing the words of the “former Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, by saying that Israel should be wiped off the map”.[56]
As a proof of their ever closer ties, in 2012 Iran condoned Nicaragua´s debt for 164 M USD in 2012.[57] Libya had also condoned a 195 M USD debt in favor of Nicaragua in 2011. Other new born allies of leftist Latin-America are North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya. Needless to say, those countries represent a threat against Western-Capitalistic values. In a way, Latin-American left allied with an Anti-Western-Imperialistic block against Anglo-Western capitalistic imperialism.
4. The Colombian Comeback and the Decline of US Aid
It is crystal clear that such regional environment was a matter of great concern for Colombia. Under Uribe’s Administration the levels of confrontation had gone up to the ceiling, isolating Colombia from its regional counterparts. Therefore, from day one President´s Santos Administration performed significant efforts to lower diplomatic and political tensions in the region. Those efforts were effective.
Against all odds, according to a Time Magazine article titled “Colombia Rising”, published on April 23, 2012, Juan Manuel Santos, the new Colombian President, profiled as the new regional leader that could fill the empty spaces left by former Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva and by cancer-ill President Chavez.[58]
In spite of Santos´ repeated confrontations with Chavez and Correa during the former´s exercise as Ministry of Defense of President Uribe, since he first took office as President in 2010 things rapidly improved. Diplomatic relations and trade between Colombia and its two neighbors were immediately restored. Also, while continuing with the execution of Colombian traditional antinarcotics policy, Santos affirmed in different forums the necessity to review the world´s antidrug policy.
In April 2012, at the Summit of the Americas, which counted with the presence of President Barack Obama, Santos said:
“I think the time has come to simply analyze if what we are doing is the best we could be doing, or if we can find an alternative that would be more effective and less costly to society”[59]
More importantly, in September 2012, although without explicitly calling for narcotics to be legalized, Santos suggested at the U.N. General Assembly that Colombia would welcome “wholesale changes to policies that have shown scant evidence of limiting drug flows while contributing to massive violence throughout Latin America”.[60]
Latin-American countries thus found renewed points of encounter with the Colombian government, which began to expand its terrain of influence and to improve its negotiation capacity. Moreover, Colombia, Peru, México, the hemisphere´s liberal countries, as well as Chile under a new Administration, began discussing the possibility to enter into a new integration agenda, known as the Pacific Alliance (Alianza Pacífico). The interest of those countries in advancing such agenda was made public in the Lima Declaration, as of April 28, 2011.[61]
While Colombia´s isolation in the hemisphere began to decrease, some additional positive results of counterinsurgency and antinarcotics operations were achieved. Tough man of FARC, Mono Jojoy, was killed in a bombing in 2010[62]; followed by Alfonso Cano, the most reputed thinker of the rebel group, who was killed in 2011. Several other FARC leaders were also killed in military operations, such as Magali Grannobles, alias ‘Mayerly’ (2010), Jerónimo Galeano (2011) and Alirio Rojas Bocanegra (2011), amongst others.[63]
Colombian success in several of its most pressing challenges, made clear that US aid was less necessary than before. Therefore, US economic assistance via Plan Colombia began to decline rapidly after 2010. However, other reasons for such decline must be mentioned. First, American economic recession, which began with the bursting of the housing bubble of 2007, and with the growth of subprime and adjustable-rate mortgages payment defaults in 2007 and 2008, put a huge pressure over aid granted by the US to other countries. Second, the approval by the American Congress of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement in 2011 was seen as an additional help for Colombian economy and prosperity.
Third, the decline of US oil dependence due to the latest developments of technology that allows the exploitation of natural shale gas deposits in American soil[64], probably impacted its interest in Venezuelan oil, and therefore in South American political landscape as a whole. Fourth and last, US foreign policy under Barack Obama loosened dramatically, given its compromise with multilateralism and other priorities in its agenda, such as Muahamar Gadafi´s Libya and Kim Jong Il´s and Kim Jong Un´s North Korea.
In spite of the above, it is probable that Obama´s Administration will keep aiding Colombia with military, intelligence and economic assistance in the upcoming years, notwithstanding a reduction of the aid amount year by year. For 2013, the Obama Administration asked the American Congress to approve a 332 Million USD aid package, which is a 15% reduction in comparison with the 400 Million USD budget approved for 2012. The continuity of American aid might be explained by the geopolitical considerations presented in Chapters 2 and 3 above, which make apparent that Colombia is still US´ main political ally in the hemisphere, as well a country of immense strategic, geopolitical and economic importance for the latter´s regional and national interest.
As an evidence of the continuity of such close ties between Colombia and the US it is noteworthy that Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon arrived the 24th of April, 2013 to Washington, where he stayed for nearly three days, and met Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the Director of the CIA John Brennan, the Director of DEA Michele Leonhart, as well as other top officials of the National Security Council and the Department of Defense.[65]
5. Peace dialogues in La Habana: Last Chance for Peace
Since the 1980´s the Colombian government has held peace negotiations with FARC in four occasions. The first in the 1980´s – during the presidency of Belisario Betancourt – took place in Bogota. The second, during the 1990´s, under the mandate of President Cesar Gaviria, took place in Tlaxcala, Mexico. The third, between 1998 and 2002, during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana, took place in the “distension zone” of el Caguan and its neighbor municipalities, as it was explained earlier. The last one, which was officially announced in Oslo as of October 18, 2012, began during the first year of President´s Santos administration, and is currently taking place in La Habana, Cuba.
Despite obvious difficulties always present in a negotiation of this sort, this time the peace dialogues and agreements seem to be advancing properly. The agenda of the negotiation includes the following topics: (i) agrarian reform, (ii) political participation after demobilization, (iii) the end of the conflict, (iv) illicit drugs, and (v) victims. Until now, only the first topic has been discussed.
According to the media and different unofficial and official sources, the discussion on the agrarian reform seems to be advancing effectively. Moreover, after 5 months of negotiation, FARC announced the past 30th of April of 2013 that their organization is confident that a final agreement regarding the first topic of the agenda will be reached. After reaching an agreement in what is probably the most difficult topic on the agenda, it is highly probable that a final peace agreement will come in the following months.
Of course, a peace agreement between FARC and the government will probably generate a huge impact over the antinarcotics policy, particularly given the fact that some estimates conclude that nearly 60,000 peasants (campesinos) cultivate coca-leaf in FARC´s influence areas. A peace agreement will surely include the obligation of the government to provide economic alternatives for those peasants, as well as to increase government spending in those areas in order to improve access to quality education, public services and the exercise of fundamental rights. Even more, it could include an agreement to work jointly in manual eradication activities.
However, it is probably naïve to believe that a peace agreement with FARC will solve the problem of the war on drugs on its own. It is highly probably that other illegal organizations will try to occupy the place previously occupied by FARC in the narcotics-business-chain. Thus, the vacuum of power that a peace agreement would leave would need to be rapidly occupied by the state and its armed forces in order to prevent smaller criminal organizations to rise. That is where US support remains fundamental.
[1] Mr. Enciso is a Colombian attorney, with an LL.M. degree from Columbia University. He currently works as Deputy Director of the Productive Transformation Programme of the Colombian Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. He teaches criminal law in several Colombian universities.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not of his employer or any agency of the Colombian government.
[2] Beers, Rand. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. “Plan Colombia: An Initial Assessment”. Washington, D.C. February 28, 2001. HTTP://BOGOTA.USEMBASSY.GOV/TESTIMONY7.HTML
[3] Toma de Miraflores. Watch video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HshxcZBxcuQ. As of: April 27, 2013. Miraflores antinarcotics headquarter was located in the province of Guaviare. It stood until 1998´s defeat as the main antinarcotics Colombian base. Such attack evidenced FARC´s effort to protect the drug business, which it used as one of its main financing sources. As a result of the attack, 13 soldiers were killed and 26 injured, 73 soldiers and 56 policemen were kidnapped, and a large amount of ammunition and fire power was lost.
[5] United States Support For Colombia. Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. March 28, 2000.
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html As of: May 1, 2013.
[6] In 2009, several years after the inception of Plan Colombia, Noam Chomsky delivered a lecture that accurately summarized left criticism on Plan Colombia. Noam. US War on Drugs in Latin America. December 15, 2009. MIT Conference. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3Xa8Irev2E As of: April 27, 2013.
[7] Polo Democrático Alternativo. “Sobre el Plan Colombia”. November 11, 2000.. http://www.moir.org.co/SOBRE-EL-PLAN-COLOMBIA.html As of: April 27, 2013.
[8] United States Support For Colombia. Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. March 28, 2000.
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html As of: May 1, 2013.
[9] Beers, Rand. Idem. “Plan Colombia: An Initial Assessment”. 2001.
[10] United States Support For Colombia. Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. March 28, 2000.
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html As of: May 1, 2013.
The author is aware that the sum doesn’t amount 1.6 billion. However, such is the official information provided by the American Government in its request of resources to the American Congress.
[11] Plan Colombia. April 23, 2013. http://bogota.usembassy.gov/plancolombia.html As of: April 29, 2013.
[12] “Popularidad de Alvaro Uribe por las nubes: 91%”. July 10, 2008.
http://noticias.terra.com/noticias/popularidad_de_alvaro_uribe_por_las_nubes_91/act1330583 As of: April 27, 2013.
[13] Beer, Randy. Idem.
[14] Idem.
[15] “Impuesto de Guerra fue aprobado por Congreso colombiano.” December 13, 2006.
http://www.peaceobservatory.org/es/3472/impuesto-de-guerra-fue-aprobado-por-el-congreso-colombiano As of: April 28, 2013. Also: “El impuesto de guerra”. September 20, 2009.
http://www.uniderecho.com/leer_articulo_Derecho-En-general_7_1485.html As of: April 28, 2013.
[16] Idem.
[17] Idem.
[18] “Congreso aprueba impuesto de Guerra”. El Espectador. December 9, 2009.
http://www.elespectador.com/economia/articulo177755-congreso-aprueba-impuesto-de-guerra As of: April 28, 2013.
[19] Balance of Plan Colombia. 1999-2005. National Development Plan. P. 9.
[20] Idem. P. 20.
[21] Colombia: censo de cultivos de coca en diciembre de 2003. June, 2004. P. 11.
[22] Idem. P. 13.
[23] Balance of Plan Colombia. 1999-2005. National Development Plan. P. 9. P. 15.
[24] Idem. P. 16.
[25] Idem. P. 17.
[26] Idem. P. 29.
[27] Plan Colombia. April 23, 2013. P.1 http://bogota.usembassy.gov/plancolombia.html As of: May 1, 2013.
[28] Comunicado de Prensa del DANE. March 22, 2012. P. 2.
http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/pib/cp_PIB_IVtrim11.pdf As of: May 1, 2013.
[29] Censo de cultivos de coca. UNODC. 2011.
http://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/censo_de_cultivos_de_coca_2011_small.pdf As of: May 1, 2013.
[30] Colombia: censo de cultivos de coca en diciembre de 2003. June, 2004.
http://www.biesimci.org/documentos/archivos/Colombia_coca_survey_es03.pdf As of: May 1, 2013.
[31] “Perú, el segundo productor mundial de hoja de coca después de Colombia”. September 27, 2012.
[32] “Seguridad en la administración Santos. Dos años de discusiones”. August 6, 2012.
[33] Idem.
[35] Nicaragua´s President stands for 5 years terms.
[36] Salvador Allende allegedly committed suicide during the military occupation of the Palacio de la Moneda, the presidential home.
[37] Vulliamy, Ed. “Venezuela coup linked to Bush team”. The Guardian. April 21, 2002. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/21/usa.venezuela
[38] “Cronología: Colombia vs. Venezuela”. December 13, 2004. BBC Mundo.
[39] Reyes was FARC #2 at the moment of his death.
[40] The bombing and death of Raul Reyes catapulted then Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos as the most likely successor of President Alvaro Uribe, with a 57% of popularity, as of March 4, 2010. President’s Uribe popularity reached a 91% (!) peak after more than 6 years in power, after Ingrid Betancourt’s rescue operation in 2008. Uribe’s popularity still today exceeds 70%.
[41] A year after the Colombian army strike in Ecuadorian soil, Defense Minister of the time, Juan Manuel Santos, argued in favor of Colombia´s right to defend itself from terrorist organizations, whether they are sitting on Colombian soil or not. He assessed that striking terrorists that are systematically attempting against a country´s citizens is an act of legitimate defense and a form of conduct coherent with international law. Taylhardat, Adolfo. “Soberanía vs. Legítima Defensa”. March 11, 2009.
http://www.adolfotaylhardat.net/soberaniavslegitimadefensa.htm As of: April 28, 2013.
[42] Ecuadorian President Correa asserted that whether that citizen was a person engaged in criminal activities or not made no difference with regard to the unlawful attack. Furthermore, after forensic examination of the corpse of the Ecuadorian citizen, Ecuador signaled that that person had been extra summarily executed.
[43] Colmenares, Martha. “Nuevo homenaje y estatua a Manuel Marulanda (Tirofijo), terrorista de FARC”. April 22, 2010.
[44] “La CIA planifica magnicidio del Presidente del Ecuador, Alerta Periodista Chileno Patricio Mery”. November 4, 2012.
[45] Acuerdo complementario para la Cooperación y Asistencia Técnica en Defensa y Seguridad entre los Gobiernos de la República de Colombia y de los Estados Unidos de América. November 3, 2009.
http://web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2009/noviembre/03/acuerdo.pdf As of: May 1, 2013.
[46] “Mercosur. ¿Quiénes somos?”. Official Web Page of Mercosur.
[47] “Comenzó a funcionar el Banco del Sur. Institución multilateral conformada por Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela y Uruguay”. April 3, 2012.
http://www.espectadornegocios.com/core.php?m=amp&nw=ODE1MQ== As of: April 28, 2013.
[48] “Historia de UNASUR”. http://www.unasursg.org/inicio/organizacion/historia As of: April 28, 2013.
[54] Idem.
[58] Padget, Tim and Otis, John. “Colombia Rising”. April 23, 2012. News Week.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2111817,00.html As of: May 1, 2013.
[59] White, Jeremy B. “Drug Policy Divides Obama and Latin American Leaders in America´s Summit”. April 16, 2012. http://www.ibtimes.com/drug-policy-divides-obama-latin-american-leaders-americas-summit-437872#
[60] Winter, Brian. “US led War on Drugs Questioned at UN”. Reuters. September 26, 2012.
[62] “Muerte Mono Jojoy”. El Tiempo. March 22, 2013. http://www.eltiempo.com/noticias/muerte-mono-jojoy
[63] “Recientes golpes a las FARC: ¿se acaban los “históricos” de esa guerrilla?” Revista Semana. June 9, 2011. http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/recientes-golpes-farc-se-acaban-historicos-esta-guerrilla/241094-3 As of: May 1, 2013.
[65] “EEUU reforzará lucha contra el terrorismo en Colombia”. El Tiempo. May 1, 2013.
http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12772865.html As of: May 1, 2013.
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