Lessons from the Guatemalan Peace Accords for the Colombian Peace Process

November 30, 2013

This paper aims to portray some of the most important lessons that Colombians may learn from the negotiations that led to the end of the civil war in Guatemala in 1996, after nearly 30 years of armed conflict. The document is structured as follows: (i) introduction, (ii) peace negotiations, (iii) end of the conflict: the final peace agreement, (iv) the aftermath of the civil war, and (v) conclusions and lessons for the Colombian case.

(i)             Introduction

The influence of socialist ideas in LatinAmerica in the mid 1980`s as well as the proliferation of left-wing heavily armed guerrillas led to a new climax of the Cold War in the American hemisphere. The success of the Sandinist revolution in Nicaragua, the evolution of FARC and ELN in Colombia, the progress of the FMLN in El Salvador, and the advance of the URNG in Guatemala, caused huge concern in pro-capitalist countries.

Thus, in 1986 Central American governments agreed on holding two meetings in Esquipulas, Guatemala, which aimed at opening alternatives for finding negotiated solutions to the civil wars ongoing in the aforementioned countries. Guatemala, of course, was not the exception. After 30 years of civil war, where a strategic balance of power was reached, the moment was ripe for finding a different way out to the conflict.

(ii)           Peace negotiations

Peace negotiations in Guatemala began in 1991 and concluded in 1996. Taking into account the final goal of this paper – namely, highlighting relevant lessons for the Colombian peace negotiations between the government and FARC rebels that began in 2011 – I will analyze the following aspects of the negotiation process: (1) intervention of foreign actors, (2) intervention of the civil society, (3) negotiation agenda and duration of the negotiations, and (4) cease-fire.

ii.1. Intervention of foreign actors

The meetings held by the Presidents of Central America in 1986 and 1987, known as Esquipulas I and Esquipulas II, helped to create an adequate climate for peace negotiations between conflicting parties not just in Guatemala but also in Nicaragua and El Salvador. For the reasons explained below, Esquipulas II was of particular importance for peace negotiations in Central America.

According to Pablo Monsanto, historical leader of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), those meetings intended to isolate the Sandinist Popular Revolution and oblige it to negotiate with the counter-revolutionary forces that were being financed and promoted by the American Government. However, Monsanto also asserts that for the URNG, founded in 1982, those meetings were seen – paradoxically – as a political space in which the real nature of the “façade-democracy” operating in Guatemala could be unveiled, and where the bases for a negotiation could be settled. (Monsanto, 2013)

URNG thought that the first condition for negotiating peace was to open a space for “dialogue”. Thus, the General Commanders (Comandancia General) of that organization decided to begin the process towards a negotiated agreement in two steps: first, demonstrate the nature of “political maneuver” of the supposed democratization process initiated by the Guatemalan state, because the URGN thought that the army remained the central axis of power and kept the posture that the only possible solution for the armed conflict was the unconditioned rendition of the guerilla; and second, obtain international political support that would contribute to legitimate the need to continue the armed revolution in Guatemala. (Monsanto, 2013)

The URGN strategy worked perfectly. Delegates of the Guatemalan government and the leaders of the URNG held an exploratory meeting in Spain in October of 1987, in furtherance of the compromises that the Guatemalan, Nicaraguan and Salvadorian governments had agreed upon after Esquipulas II, which had imposed on them the duty to explore dialogue options with rebel groups. After that meeting, rising pressure was put by the international community and domestic actors on the military and the government in order to force them to install formal peace-talks with the URNG. (Monsanto, 2013)

Esquipulas II also proved relevant because in furtherance of its agreements three National Reconciliation Commissions (NRCs) were created for El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, as we shall see below. It was also important because it led to the full involvement of the United Nations as a mediator in the peace talks after 1994, and as a guarantor of the compliance of the peace agreements by the creation of a Verification Mission called International Mission of the United Nations for the Verification of the Peace Process in Guatemala. (Monsanto, 2013)

On the other hand, Monsanto asserts – 16 years later after the final peace agreement was signed – that the agreements failed in creating mechanisms that would secure the compliance of what had been stipulated. Particularly, the lack of compromise of the international community to provide the economic resources that the compliance of the other agreements needed was an important flaw. (Monsanto, 2013)

ii. 2. Intervention of the civil society

As mentioned above, Esquipulas II ordered the creation of CNRs for El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. The CNRs were presided by a Catholic Bishop in each case, and integrated by representatives of the political parties and “noble” citizens. The URNG obtained great benefit from the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission in Guatemala (CNRG), as the rebels saw the space for “dialogue” that the CNRG opened as a first step toward opening the door for peace negotiations. (Monsanto, 2013)

The CNRG managed to organize a National Dialogue in 1989. Initially, the radical left was not invited to participate in the event, yet it was of huge importance for the URNG as it allowed it to have a full understanding of the positions of several institutions and organizations regarding the problems of the country, and particularly of the war.  (Monsanto, 2013)

Some time after, the CNRG helped the URNG to open dialogue lines with the civil society, as well as to find spaces to explain other citizens its view of Guatemala`s problems, discuss such view and try to find common interests with them. Opening such space for dialogue was one of the main strategies used by the URNG to put pressure on the government in order to agree on the need of negotiating the substantive topics, this is, the problems that originated the conflict. (Monsanto, 2013)

In 1990, a very important step was given. That year the government authorized a meeting in Oslo between the rebels and the CNRG. As a result of the Oslo meeting, the CNRG and the URNG agreed on the need that the URNG could hold a set of meetings with representatives of political parties, churches, businessmen affiliated to the Coordination Committee of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance Associations and Chambers (CACIF), labor unions, academic institutions, and social organizations of all sorts.

Those meetings took place between May and October 1990, and the parties concluded that the Constitution of 1985 had to be reformed. Also, as a result of those meetings, the faults and crimes of the army became apparent before the eyes of the civil society, thus isolating the army and providing additional negotiation leverage for the URNG. (Monsanto, 2013)

The following months, the URNG and the government agreed to formally install peace talks. Also, they agreed that bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño, President of the CNRG would moderate the peace talks, which would count with the overview of a representative of the General Secretariat of the United Nations. Those agreements were formalized in July of 1991, when both parties signed the Queretaro Agreement, which settled the thematic agenda of the negotiation.

Three years after, in 1994 the government negotiators (COPAZ), presided by Héctor Rosada, required the removal from bishop Quezada from the peace talks under the accusation that he had a favorable attitude toward the positions of the URNG. The outcome favored URNG greatly for two reasons. First, because the dynamic of the peace talks moved from the moderation (of bishop Quezada) toward the mediation of a delegate from the General Secretariat of the UN, thus increasing international pressure on the parties to achieve agreements.  (Monsanto, 2013)

Second, because bishop Quezada was charged with the responsibility of calling and integrating an Assembly of the Civil Society that had the task of elaborating proposals to the negotiators of both sides regarding five topics: resettlement of forcefully displaced persons; identity and rights of indigenous communities; socioeconomic and agrarian aspects; enhancement of civil power and role of the army in a democratic society; and constitutional reform and electoral regime. (Monsanto, 2013)

In conclusion, the Guatemalan case shows that the involvement of the civil society represents larger strategic benefits for rebels in the preamble or course of negotiations, because it helps them to engage in open dialogue with citizens and the civil society, thus increasing political recognition; also, because it helps to include new topics in the negotiation agenda that would otherwise not be included, such as the need for a constitutional reform! Finally, because an open dialogue with the civil society generally helps to raise awareness of the flaws committed by the elites in power, and helps to lean the balance of public opinion in favor of rebel groups.

ii. 3. Negotiation agenda and duration of the negotiations

Formal peace talks in Guatemala began in July of 1991, after the parties signed the Queretaro Agreement. The Final Peace Agreement was only signed five years later, in 1996. However, along the whole negotiations, significant advance was made regarding different topics.

Seven different agreements were signed regarding substantive topics, such as human rights; resettlement of forcefully displaced population; establishment of a truth commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico); identity and rights of indigenous communities; socioeconomic and agrarian aspects; enhancement of civil power and role of the army in a democratic society; and constitutional reforms and electoral rules. (Monsanto, 2013)

Only after those seven agreements were signed the parties agreed upon the final agreements that put an end to the conflict, namely: the final cease fire agreement; the agreement that settled the bases for the incorporation of the URNG to legality; the schedule for the implementation, compliance and verification of the peace agreements; and lastly, the Final Peace Agreement (Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera). (Monsanto, 2013)

Thus, it is clear that a negotiation solution for an armed conflict takes more that normal people would like. In Guatemala, reaching the final agreements took at least 4 years of negotiation and a different set of minor accords leading to the Final Peace Agreement. Other peace processes have not been different. For example, the Final Peace Agreement signed in the Chapultepec Castle by the government of El Salvador and the FMLN in 1992 was only reached after 3 years of negotiation.

In conclusion, finding negotiated solutions to internal conflicts may be hard, long and difficult. It is important to be aware that the negotiations might last for a very long time before producing substantive results. The public opinion and the press will always expect the process to move fast and produce immediate solutions, but the reality of what happens in the negotiating room is very different. What is at stake is simply too important. However, the partial agreements reached on substantive matters in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala proved to be a good way to advance safely in the course of peace-talks in spite of the delay of the overall negotiations.

ii.4. Cease-Fire

Along the Guatemala peace negotiation the conflict continued. The army would execute strong military offensives prior to each round of negotiations as a means of debilitating the negotiation capacity of the URNG. The URNG responded accordingly. It created two new “fronts” (batallions): the “Panzós Heróico”, in Alta Verapaz, and refounded the Urban Front, in Guatemala City and its surrounding areas. Also, it reactivated a Unitary Front, which operated in a ratio of 50 kilometers from the capital, and which at certain point of the conflict took over Escuintla, an industrial city located in the southern coast of Guatemala. (Monsanto, 2013)

The URNG thought that its main “card” in the negotiations was to have an active armed force. Thus, it never agreed to a cease-fire, as COPAZ wanted, in spite of the black propaganda of the military and extreme right wing organizations. (Monsanto, 2013) Peace talks in El Salvador had been similar in this regard. A cease-fire was only agreed in the final months of the negotiation for the same reasons.

According to Miguel Sanz, former leader of the FMLN in El Salvador:

One of the decisions that, throughout time, demonstrated to be correct was that we never accepted a cease-fire, in spite of the strong pressure of the Salvadorian government, the government of the United States of America, and the mediator of the United Nations. It was said to the FMLN: “it is contradictory and it is unacceptable to be negotiating, and simultaneously hold an armed struggle”, and the FMLN always replied: “The cease fire will be a consequence of a bilateral agreement and will occur when substantial and definite agreements have been reached”. (Sanz, 2013)

Sanz concludes his analysis by contending that if the FMLN had agreed on a cease-fire, very likely the negotiation would have not produced the results that were finally reached, because Cristiani and the Americans would have tried to impose the agreements of the negotiation in their own terms. He adds that the outcome of the Offensive “To the Top” (“Al Tope”) is a clear prove of the importance of military action by rebel groups in order to make the peace negotiations progress. (Sanz, 2013)

Similarly, the URNG was probably aware of the importance of not agreeing on a cease-fire, not just because they knew very well the peace process of El Salvador, which has ended successfully in 1992, but because they were also aware of the genocide committed against militants of the Patriotic Union (Union Patriótica) in Colombia, the political party that had been created in the 1980s with the aim of reincorporating FARC rebels to civil life.

In conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that public opinion may find it necessary that rebels agree on a cease-fire as a evidence of good faith in a peace negotiation, after the historical lessons of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, it is highly unlikely that any rebel group will agree on a permanent cease-fire before it has secured agreements on the most important topics of a peace negotiation.

(iii)          End of the conflict: The Final Peace Accord

In 1996 URNG and COPAZ signed the Final Peace Accord. Former URNG leaders believe that significant agreements were reached in such document. First, rules for building a stronger democracy – controlled by civilians instead of military officers – were defined. Second, the recognition of indigenous communities as central elements of the culture, history and future of Guatemala was also agreed. Third, it was agreed that nearly 50 reforms, aimed at protecting human rights, improving the administration of justice system, and the rule of law, would need to be enacted soon thereafter.

It is noteworthy that the Final Peace Accord did not adopt a general blanket amnesty. The Accord left open the possibility for criminal prosecution in the most grievous crimes perpetrated during the civil war. As Raquel Aldana, 2012, asserts, the United Nations supported truth commission investigations that helped to shed light on the criminal and moral liability of those who engaged in brutal actions against civilians and combatants throughout the conflict. However, no international criminal trials have followed, with the sole exception of some cases brought before Spanish courts. Also, domestic trials have also been scarce. Only a few cases were brought before local courts, as a consequence of the pressure put by a  “tenacious group of victims”. (Aldana, 2012)

Moreover, as mentioned above the United Nations also agreed in creating a special overview commission named MINUGUA, with the mission of guaranteeing that the agreements of the Final Peace Accord would be respected.  (Monsanto, 2013) Below in Chapter (iv) I will elaborate on the evolution of the main components of the Final Peace Accord.

In other regard, the Final Peace Accord also incorporated several partial agreements that had been reached throughout the negotiation. One of them was the partial agreement whereby the parties agreed on the reincorporation of the combatants to civil and political life, namely the Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. According to such partial agreement, the process or integrating members URNG would operate as follows:

2. The process of integrating members of URNG shall begin with the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace and shall lead to their lasting integration into the civil life of the country. The integration process shall be divided into two phases: an initial integration phase, which shall last one calendar year starting on D+60, and a subsequent, definitive integration phase, for the medium term, in which the support required to consolidate the process will be provided. (Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)

This partial agreement detailed how reincorporation of URNG rebels would come into effect in different areas: economic, political, civil, legal, etc. The outcome of this agreement will be assessed in Chapter (iv) below.

Finally, it is also noteworthy that the Final Peace Accord included some articles that were meant to promote the creation of a more just and equitable society. However, such articles are somewhat abstract and evince that the negotiating force of the URNG at that point of the conversations was at a low level. (Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera, 1996)

(iv)          Aftermath of the civil war and compliance of the agreements

Many former URNG rebels as well as government officers that negotiated the partial agreements and the Final Peace Accord in the 1990s believe that many agreements have not been fully enforced. Below, an assessment of the enforcement and compliance of the agreements that I consider more relevant is presented, particularly those dealing with indigenous rights; truth and reparation; justice reform; democratization and reintegration into civil and political life of rebels; economic reform and the land problem; and legal reform.

iv.1. Indigenous Rights

More than 50% of Guatemalans are indigenous. However, they have historically been subject to all sorts of discrimination. Therefore, the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was an enormous leap in the process of improving their recognition as citizens and their right against all forms of discrimination. The Agreement says:

To overcome the age-old discrimination against indigenous peoples the assistance of all citizens will be needed in the effort to change thinking, attitudes and behaviour. This change must begin with a clear recognition by all Guatemalans of the reality of racial discrimination and of the compelling need to overcome it and achieve true peaceful coexistence.

Unfortunately, in spite of the recognition of the Agreement that Guatemala is a “multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual nation”, where discrimination should be suppressed, the truth is that discrimination continues, particularly due to the lack of will of the governing elite. According to the Conclusions of the International Conference of the European Parliament that met in May 2 and 3 of 2007 with the purpose of evaluating the compliance of the Guatemala Peace Accords “progress in the compliance of the Accords has been minimal. There are large and persistent obstacles to the realization of indigenous rights”. (European Parliament, 2007)

The situation of poverty, social exclusion and discrimination faced by Guatemala’s indigenous peoples has not changed substantially. In this respect, there has been a very low level of compliance with this Accord. Although there has been progress with respect to cultural rights, the problems of access to land, legal security and the rights of indigenous peoples remain unresolved. (European Parliament, 2007)

Taking into account the above, it may be argued that cultural violence – as defined by Galtung, 1990 – remains:

By 'cultural violence' we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. (Galtung, 1990)

Also, it may be argued that structural violence remains. Marginalization and fragmentation of indigenous communities is the common place. The lack of access to education, health, land and food is the general rule, in a country where indigenous communities remain in extreme poverty. Thus, it is possible to conclude that in spite of some progress made in the field of legal recognition, de facto discrimination continues to be the general rule. Also, it may be argued that the peace reached in Guatemala is at least fragile, if we are to accept that many of the grievances that led to the conflict still remain. (Ohlson, 2008)

iv.2. Truth and Reparation

As noted above in Chapter (iii), the rights of the victims to know the truth and to be fully repaired were not fulfilled. Some progress was made but it did not reach the needs of the post-conflict era. The Report of the Truth Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico), the exhumation and identification of myriads of corpses of victims of the war, and also some initiatives to create registries of victims and to regulate access to public documents and archives, were significant yet insufficient efforts. (Impunity Watch) Hundreds of victims still wait to know the truth of what happened to their siblings, parents or children; hundreds of them still wait to be repaired. (Sandoval, 2013)

However, as Keira Goldstein asserts, in the “aftermath of atrocities it was once common to sacrifice justice for peace”. She explains that criminal prosecutions were seen as situations that could put at risk fragile peace accords. As an example, the author mentions the case of Uruguay, were voters upheld an amnesty for officers who had committed human rights violations. People feared that prosecutions against those military officers would result in a return to a military dictatorship. (Goldstein, 2006)

Thus, the interaction between justice and peace might be better described as a trade-off: peace versus justice. Goldstein believes that a middle point to that dichotomy may be found in modern peace negotiations, where some level of impunity is granted in exchange for some level of truth and punishment. However, she still acknowledges the fact that in occasions, trying to purge a complete army would put at risk the need of achieving peace. (Goldstein, 2006)

It is important to have this in mind, as putting an end to some of the longest civil wars requires some level of impunity. Punishment is not necessarily the best or only way to end a conflict. Thus, it is at least arguable the assertion of those who define the Guatemalan peace process as a failure because many of the perpetrators of human rights violations have not been tried. The debate, however, is no an easy one. After all, the conflict left 200,000 people dead and the Truth Commission found that acts of genocide were committed by the state against indigenous Mayan people between 1982 and 1983. (Rohter, 1999)

iii.3. Justice reform

According to Aldana, 2012, some important reforms were made on the administration of justice system beginning in 1994, two years before the Final Peace Accord was signed, but after the Comprehensive Human Rights Agreement was reached in March 29, 1994. That year, the criminal justice system adopted an adversarial model, which modified the role of the prosecutor and police along the investigations while simultaneously expanding the role of the victims in them. Moreover, Guatemala established in its Constitution that common crimes perpetrated by the military should be tried by civil-courts. (Aldana, 2012)

Later, in 1996, the Penal Code was modified, including the crime of “forceful disappearance”, thus expanding criminal liability beyond the crime of “kidnapping”. Interestingly enough, in 2009 the Constitutional Court found – in a groundbreaking ruling – that the forceful disappearance crime was an “ongoing crime”, therefore allowing the application of the amended 1996 Penal Code to the forced disappearances perpetrated during the civil war! Some years after, in 2005, Guatemala created a Human Right Unit to prosecute the cases occurred during the war. (Aldana, 2012)

Finally, in 2006, with aid provided by the World Bank and United Nations (UNOPS), a project aimed at the modernization of the legal tracking systems of the judiciary of Guatemala was implemented. Such project helped to keep better track of the cases, judicial decisions, prisoners and frozen assets of criminals.

In spite of the progress, still much more remained to be done. The judicial system is extremely slow, backlog of files is the common rule in all types of courts, and corruption is extremely high. (Impunity Watch) According to Impunity Watch 2010 report:

In the research prepared by IW it was apparent that the fields where less progress exists are access to justice and depuration of state institutions. Based on the obstacles identified by the research, IW recommends that the institutions of the state, particularly the Prosecutors Office, the Police and the Administrative Branch of the Judiciary, adopt necessary measures and strategies to fulfill with their mission. (Impunity Watch, 2010)

In conclusion, the Final Peace Agreement did help to transform the judicial system of Guatemala yet the efforts made until know still prove weak.

iv.4. Reincorporation of the URNG in the civil and political life

The reincorporation of the URNG in the civil and political life of Guatemala proved to be full of obstacles. Regarding the reincorporation to civil life, such process was particularly tough as many combatants had left their homes, families and jobs during many years, and all of a sudden had to restart their lives from scratch, as real strangers even to their own families. They also found several difficulties in finding decent jobs, in the urban or rural areas.

Regarding the incorporation to political life, URNG found difficulties in order to transform its military power into political organization and electoral capacity. According to Goldstein:

The agreement specifies how political spaces are to be kept open. Broadly speaking, in the UN mediated peace process, groups “once excluded and repressed received new rights, legal recognition, and access to the legal political arena, among them the indigenous peoples and former revolutionaries of the URNG. (Goldstein, 2006)

The truth is, however, that URNG political inexperience, the effort of its leaders to assure the compliance of the Final Peace Accord by the military and COPAZ, and the lack of an economic safety net led the demobilized rebels toward a complete failure in the political arena.

Thus, after the Final Peace Accord was signed, contrary to what happened with the FMLN in El Salvador, where such group recently reached the Presidency, the URNG rapidly lost influence in the political life of Guatemala. David Holiday suggest that “while making it the third political force in Congress and offering an important venue for participation, nevertheless essentially (the URNG) translated its military defeat into political defeat”. (Holiday, 2000)

iii.5. Economic reform and the land problem

In furtherance of the Accord on Socio-Economic Aspects and the Land Problem, some progress has been made in different fronts during the years following 1996. Goldstein explains that during the peace negotiations, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund were in close contact with the mediators. After the experiences of Nicaragua and El Salvador, those institutions, aware of the risks of fast liberalization, pressed simultaneously for reforms that endorsed free market but also committed the national government to increase the levels of social welfare investment. (Goldstein, 2006)

Somehow and against all odds, the financial institutions came to view a reduction in Guatemala’s socio-economic inequalities as a requisite for a lasting peace. Nevertheless, the full compliance of the Accord on Socio-Economic Aspects and the Land Problem has confronted several obstacles, particularly regarding the land problem. According to the European Parliament the main problems for the implementation of the agreement have been the lack of access to production resources and the increasing level of land conflicts. Also the land ownership system and the scarce access to cultivable lands, added to the concentration of land in fewer hands, remain the epicenter of the land conflict. (European Parliament, 2007)

In addition, land ownership structure is directly linked to extreme poverty and malnutrition of the indigenous population, one of the most horrific forms of structural violence ongoing in Guatemala. (Galtung, 1990) Moreover, the lands that were purchased or awarded in the past through the Land Fund have been subdivided into smaller plots, thus generating insurmountable productivity obstacles that derive in the purchase of those small parcels by historical landowners.

Finally, it is apparent that there is no consistent national rural development policy. In the past European cooperation entities provided technical and financial support in major rural development projects, but not any longer. The withdrawal of those entities from Guatemala has left a vacuum that has not been filled by state agencies yet. (European Parliament, 2007)

iii.6. Legal reform

As of May 16, 1999, Guatemalan citizens voted for the approval – or rejection – of 50 constitutional reforms necessary for the fulfillment of the Final Peace Accord. Surprisingly, the referendum failed to reach the approval of voters, an event that would have ratified and institutionalized the changes that the peace process had made apparent that were needed. (Holiday, 2000)

Whereas at least four million citizens had the right to vote only 758,000 persons did so, this is 18.5% of the electoral census. Moreover, the majority of those who voted did so against the Final Peace Accord signed by the government and URNG. 55% of voters said “no”, while only 44% voted “yes”. Only 1% of the votes were void or blank. Apparently voters were easily misguided by black-propaganda campaigns promoted by extreme right-wing groups that called citizens to vote against the referendum, as well as by evangelic pastors that threatened to expel their followers from the religion if they voted “yes”. (Kyenyke, 2013)

The question that had a higher number of negative votes was the one that referred to a new definition of Guatemala as a “solidary, multicultural, plurilingual and multiethnic” nation. Only in the provinces of the North and West, which had more brutally suffered the war, an affirmative vote prevailed. (Kyenyke, 2013)

It is therefore evident that the participation of the civil society in the Guatemalan peace process did not assure that the accords reached by the conflicting parties would be ratified by referendum. It is also clear that the legal reforms that the country needed for fulfilling the peace agreements got stalled due to failed referendum, thus leaving URNG in a difficult situation. It had reached an agreement, left arms and demobilized, but the legal reforms needed to enforce what had been agreed failed to succeed.  

(v)           Conclusions and lessons for the Colombian case

The peace process between URNG and COPAZ in Guatemala leaves the following conclusions and lessons for the Colombian negotiations currently held between FARC rebels and the Colombian government:

1. Peace negotiations may take longer than the public opinion and the press expects. In Guatemala the negotiations took nearly 5 years and in El Salvador 3. Thus, the Colombian government and citizens must not despair at this point of negotiation, after a whole year of peace talks has passed. It is simply unrealistic to expect a final peace agreement to be reached before the June, 2014, Presidential elections.

2. It is also unrealistic to expect rebels to agree on a cease-fire during the initial or middle part of peace negotiations. For them, as well as for the government, putting military pressure on the other part is a rational way of improving each side`s negotiating power. Moreover, it is clear that achieving higher commitments of the state for social, political and democratic reform requires rebels to keep military pressure on the government until such commitments are made and ratified.

3. The intervention of an impartial moderator may be a good way to overcome phases where the negotiations seem to stall. In Guatemala, the UN played such important role after 1994. In Colombia, such a moment may occur during the discussion of the last points of the negotiation agenda, which might prove to be the most challenging. Therefore, it could be useful for both parties to anticipate such moment and agree on choosing such a moderator if needed.

4. The involvement of foreign actors is sometimes useful to create an adequate climate for beginning peace negotiations, such as the Esquipulas I and Esquipulas II meetings demonstrated. In the Colombian case, Cuba and Venezuela have played an important role in helping to create such environment. Also, the Norwegian involvement has helped to create trust between the parties, leading to the initiation of peace talks in La Habana more that a year ago.

5. The involvement of the civil society in the peace talks is a double-edged sword. While it may help to legitimate the final agreements reached by the parties, it does not assure by itself that the accord will be ratified, just as the Guatemalan referendum results evinced in 1999.

6. Further, the involvement of the civil society in the peace talks may help rebels to increase their political power at the domestic level; to open additional dialogue spaces with different groups of society; to overcome their traditional isolation; and finally, it may be used for harming the government`s reputation and simultaneously to legitimize their armed struggle.

7. Achieving partial agreements is a good way of making safe progress throughout peace negotiations. The peace-talks of El Salvador and Guatemala are good examples of this. Also, it is noteworthy that the current negotiations being held between the Colombian government and FARC rebels seem to be advancing properly, in part due to the smart negotiation agenda that was agreed, which aims to make partial agreements before reaching a Final Peace Accord.

8. Reincorporation to civil and political life of the rebels needs to have proper attention. Failure to negotiate this key part of the peace talks properly may leave former rebels in extreme hardship after the war is over. That hardship necessarily impacts their capacity to endeavor to political activism. 

9. Thus, the parties should increase efforts to guarantee the capacity of former rebels to reintegrate to an economic and productive life, as well as to overcome moral and psychological problems faced after the end of the war. Finally, measures should be taken in order to assure that the organization will be able to transform successfully into a political force with real option to win democratic elections.

10. Finally, both parties to the negotiation should take advantage of international actors, such as international organizations and countries, to obtain the economic aid required to implement the agreements, particularly those relative to the land reform, which are generally extremely costly and of difficult execution. This is particularly important for the Colombian case, where the Land Reform was the first accord reached by the parties in 2013.

camiloencisov@yahoo.com 

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