November 30, 2013
This paper aims to portray
some of the most important lessons that Colombians may learn from the
negotiations that led to the end of the civil war in Guatemala in 1996, after nearly 30 years of armed conflict. The document is structured as
follows: (i) introduction, (ii) peace negotiations, (iii) end of the conflict:
the final peace agreement, (iv) the aftermath of the civil war, and (v) conclusions
and lessons for the Colombian case.
(i)
Introduction
The influence of socialist
ideas in LatinAmerica in the mid 1980`s as well as the proliferation of
left-wing heavily armed guerrillas led to a new climax of the Cold War in the
American hemisphere. The success of the Sandinist revolution in Nicaragua, the evolution
of FARC and ELN in Colombia, the progress of the FMLN in El Salvador, and the
advance of the URNG in Guatemala, caused huge concern in pro-capitalist
countries.
Thus, in 1986 Central
American governments agreed on holding two meetings in Esquipulas, Guatemala,
which aimed at opening alternatives for finding negotiated solutions to the
civil wars ongoing in the aforementioned countries. Guatemala, of course, was not
the exception. After 30 years of civil war, where a strategic balance of power
was reached, the moment was ripe for finding a different way out to the
conflict.
(ii)
Peace negotiations
Peace negotiations in
Guatemala began in 1991 and concluded in 1996. Taking into account the final
goal of this paper – namely, highlighting relevant lessons for the Colombian
peace negotiations between the government and FARC rebels that began in 2011 –
I will analyze the following aspects of the negotiation process: (1) intervention
of foreign actors, (2) intervention of the civil society, (3) negotiation
agenda and duration of the negotiations, and (4) cease-fire.
ii.1. Intervention of foreign actors
The meetings held by the
Presidents of Central America in 1986 and 1987, known as Esquipulas I and Esquipulas
II, helped to create an adequate climate for peace negotiations between
conflicting parties not just in Guatemala but also in Nicaragua and El
Salvador. For the reasons explained below, Esquipulas
II was of particular importance for peace negotiations in Central America.
According to Pablo Monsanto,
historical leader of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), those
meetings intended to isolate the Sandinist Popular Revolution and oblige it to
negotiate with the counter-revolutionary forces that were being financed and
promoted by the American Government. However, Monsanto also asserts that for
the URNG, founded in 1982, those meetings were seen – paradoxically – as a
political space in which the real nature of the “façade-democracy” operating in
Guatemala could be unveiled, and where the bases for a negotiation could be
settled. (Monsanto, 2013)
URNG thought that the first
condition for negotiating peace was to open a space for “dialogue”. Thus, the
General Commanders (Comandancia General) of that organization decided to begin
the process towards a negotiated agreement in two steps: first, demonstrate the
nature of “political maneuver” of the supposed democratization process
initiated by the Guatemalan state, because the URGN thought that the army
remained the central axis of power and kept the posture that the only possible
solution for the armed conflict was the unconditioned rendition of the
guerilla; and second, obtain international political support that would
contribute to legitimate the need to continue the armed revolution in
Guatemala. (Monsanto, 2013)
The URGN strategy worked
perfectly. Delegates of the Guatemalan government and the leaders of the URNG held
an exploratory meeting in Spain in October of 1987, in furtherance of the
compromises that the Guatemalan, Nicaraguan and Salvadorian governments had
agreed upon after Esquipulas II, which had imposed on them the duty to explore dialogue
options with rebel groups. After that meeting, rising pressure was put by the
international community and domestic actors on the military and the government
in order to force them to install formal peace-talks with the URNG. (Monsanto,
2013)
Esquipulas II also proved relevant
because in furtherance of its agreements three National Reconciliation
Commissions (NRCs) were created for El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, as we
shall see below. It was also important because it led to the full involvement
of the United Nations as a mediator
in the peace talks after 1994, and as a guarantor of the compliance of the
peace agreements by the creation of a Verification Mission called International
Mission of the United Nations for the Verification of the Peace Process in
Guatemala. (Monsanto, 2013)
On the other hand, Monsanto
asserts – 16 years later after the final peace agreement was signed – that the
agreements failed in creating mechanisms that would secure the compliance of what
had been stipulated. Particularly, the lack of compromise of the international
community to provide the economic resources that the compliance of the other
agreements needed was an important flaw. (Monsanto, 2013)
ii. 2. Intervention of the civil society
As mentioned above, Esquipulas II ordered the creation of CNRs
for El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. The CNRs were presided by a Catholic
Bishop in each case, and integrated by representatives of the political parties
and “noble” citizens. The URNG obtained great benefit from the creation of the National
Reconciliation Commission in Guatemala (CNRG), as the rebels saw the space for “dialogue”
that the CNRG opened as a first step toward opening the door for peace
negotiations. (Monsanto, 2013)
The CNRG managed to
organize a National Dialogue in 1989. Initially, the radical left was not
invited to participate in the event, yet it was of huge importance for the URNG
as it allowed it to have a full understanding of the positions of several
institutions and organizations regarding the problems of the country, and
particularly of the war. (Monsanto, 2013)
Some time after, the CNRG
helped the URNG to open dialogue lines with the civil society, as well as to find
spaces to explain other citizens its view of Guatemala`s problems, discuss such
view and try to find common interests with them. Opening such space for
dialogue was one of the main strategies used by the URNG to put pressure on the
government in order to agree on the need of negotiating the substantive topics, this is, the
problems that originated the conflict. (Monsanto, 2013)
In 1990, a very important
step was given. That year the government authorized a meeting in Oslo between
the rebels and the CNRG. As a result of the Oslo meeting, the CNRG and the URNG
agreed on the need that the URNG could hold a set of meetings with
representatives of political parties, churches, businessmen affiliated to the
Coordination Committee of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance
Associations and Chambers (CACIF), labor unions, academic institutions, and
social organizations of all sorts.
Those meetings took place
between May and October 1990, and the parties concluded that the Constitution
of 1985 had to be reformed. Also, as a result of those meetings, the faults and
crimes of the army became apparent before the eyes of the civil society, thus
isolating the army and providing additional negotiation leverage for the URNG.
(Monsanto, 2013)
The following months, the
URNG and the government agreed to formally install peace talks. Also, they
agreed that bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño, President of the CNRG would moderate
the peace talks, which would count with the overview of a representative of the
General Secretariat of the United Nations. Those agreements were formalized in
July of 1991, when both parties signed the Queretaro Agreement, which settled
the thematic agenda of the negotiation.
Three years after, in 1994 the
government negotiators (COPAZ), presided by Héctor Rosada, required the removal
from bishop Quezada from the peace talks under the accusation that he had a
favorable attitude toward the positions of the URNG. The outcome favored URNG
greatly for two reasons. First, because the dynamic of the peace talks moved
from the moderation (of bishop
Quezada) toward the mediation of a
delegate from the General Secretariat of the UN, thus increasing international
pressure on the parties to achieve agreements. (Monsanto, 2013)
Second, because bishop
Quezada was charged with the responsibility of calling and integrating an
Assembly of the Civil Society that had the task of elaborating proposals to the
negotiators of both sides regarding five topics: resettlement of forcefully
displaced persons; identity and rights of indigenous communities; socioeconomic
and agrarian aspects; enhancement of civil power and role of the army in a
democratic society; and constitutional reform and electoral regime. (Monsanto,
2013)
In conclusion, the
Guatemalan case shows that the involvement of the civil society represents
larger strategic benefits for rebels in the preamble or course of negotiations,
because it helps them to engage in open dialogue with citizens and the civil
society, thus increasing political recognition; also, because it helps to
include new topics in the negotiation agenda that would otherwise not be
included, such as the need for a constitutional reform! Finally, because an
open dialogue with the civil society generally helps to raise awareness of the
flaws committed by the elites in power, and helps to lean the balance of public
opinion in favor of rebel groups.
ii. 3. Negotiation agenda and duration of the negotiations
Formal peace talks in
Guatemala began in July of 1991, after the parties signed the Queretaro
Agreement. The Final Peace Agreement was only signed five years later, in 1996.
However, along the whole negotiations, significant advance was made regarding
different topics.
Seven different agreements
were signed regarding substantive topics, such as human rights; resettlement of
forcefully displaced population; establishment of a truth commission (Comisión
para el Esclarecimiento Histórico); identity and rights of indigenous
communities; socioeconomic and agrarian aspects; enhancement of civil power and
role of the army in a democratic society; and constitutional reforms and electoral
rules. (Monsanto, 2013)
Only after those seven
agreements were signed the parties agreed upon the final agreements that put an
end to the conflict, namely: the final cease fire agreement; the agreement that
settled the bases for the incorporation of the URNG to legality; the schedule
for the implementation, compliance and verification of the peace agreements;
and lastly, the Final Peace Agreement (Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera).
(Monsanto, 2013)
Thus, it is clear that a
negotiation solution for an armed conflict takes more that normal people would
like. In Guatemala, reaching the final agreements took at least 4 years of
negotiation and a different set of minor accords leading to the Final Peace
Agreement. Other peace processes have not been different. For example, the
Final Peace Agreement signed in the Chapultepec Castle by the government of El
Salvador and the FMLN in 1992 was only reached after 3 years of negotiation.
In conclusion, finding
negotiated solutions to internal conflicts may be hard, long and difficult. It
is important to be aware that the negotiations might last for a very long time
before producing substantive results. The public opinion and the press will
always expect the process to move fast and produce immediate solutions, but the
reality of what happens in the negotiating room is very different. What is at
stake is simply too important. However, the partial agreements reached on
substantive matters in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala proved to be a
good way to advance safely in the course of peace-talks in spite of the delay
of the overall negotiations.
ii.4. Cease-Fire
Along the Guatemala peace
negotiation the conflict continued. The army would execute strong military
offensives prior to each round of negotiations as a means of debilitating the
negotiation capacity of the URNG. The URNG responded accordingly. It created
two new “fronts” (batallions): the “Panzós Heróico”, in Alta Verapaz, and
refounded the Urban Front, in Guatemala City and its surrounding areas. Also,
it reactivated a Unitary Front, which operated in a ratio of 50 kilometers from
the capital, and which at certain point of the conflict took over Escuintla, an
industrial city located in the southern coast of Guatemala. (Monsanto, 2013)
The URNG thought that its
main “card” in the negotiations was to have an active armed force. Thus, it
never agreed to a cease-fire, as COPAZ wanted, in spite of the black propaganda
of the military and extreme right wing organizations. (Monsanto, 2013) Peace
talks in El Salvador had been similar in this regard. A cease-fire was only
agreed in the final months of the negotiation for the same reasons.
According to Miguel Sanz,
former leader of the FMLN in El Salvador:
One of the decisions that,
throughout time, demonstrated to be correct was that we never accepted a cease-fire,
in spite of the strong pressure of the Salvadorian government, the government
of the United States of America, and the mediator of the United Nations. It was
said to the FMLN: “it is contradictory and it is unacceptable to be negotiating,
and simultaneously hold an armed struggle”, and the FMLN always replied: “The
cease fire will be a consequence of a bilateral agreement and will occur when
substantial and definite agreements have been reached”. (Sanz, 2013)
Sanz concludes his analysis
by contending that if the FMLN had agreed on a cease-fire, very likely the
negotiation would have not produced the results that were finally reached,
because Cristiani and the Americans would have tried to impose the agreements
of the negotiation in their own terms. He adds that the outcome of the
Offensive “To the Top” (“Al Tope”) is a clear prove of the importance of
military action by rebel groups in order to make the peace negotiations
progress. (Sanz, 2013)
Similarly, the URNG was probably
aware of the importance of not agreeing on a cease-fire, not just because they knew
very well the peace process of El Salvador, which has ended successfully in
1992, but because they were also aware of the genocide committed against
militants of the Patriotic Union (Union Patriótica) in Colombia, the political
party that had been created in the 1980s with the aim of reincorporating FARC
rebels to civil life.
In conclusion,
notwithstanding the fact that public opinion may find it necessary that rebels
agree on a cease-fire as a evidence of good faith in a peace negotiation, after
the historical lessons of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, it is highly
unlikely that any rebel group will agree on a permanent cease-fire before it
has secured agreements on the most important topics of a peace negotiation.
(iii)
End of the conflict: The Final Peace Accord
In 1996 URNG and COPAZ
signed the Final Peace Accord. Former URNG leaders believe that significant agreements
were reached in such document. First, rules for building a stronger democracy –
controlled by civilians instead of military officers – were defined. Second,
the recognition of indigenous communities as central elements of the culture, history
and future of Guatemala was also agreed. Third, it was agreed that nearly 50 reforms,
aimed at protecting human rights, improving the administration of justice
system, and the rule of law, would need to be enacted soon thereafter.
It is noteworthy that the
Final Peace Accord did not adopt a general blanket amnesty. The Accord left
open the possibility for criminal prosecution in the most grievous crimes
perpetrated during the civil war. As Raquel Aldana, 2012, asserts, the United
Nations supported truth commission investigations that helped to shed light on
the criminal and moral liability of those who engaged in brutal actions against
civilians and combatants throughout the conflict. However, no international
criminal trials have followed, with the sole exception of some cases brought
before Spanish courts. Also, domestic trials have also been scarce. Only a few
cases were brought before local courts, as a consequence of the pressure put by
a “tenacious group of victims”. (Aldana,
2012)
Moreover, as mentioned
above the United Nations also agreed in creating a special overview commission
named MINUGUA, with the mission of guaranteeing that the agreements of the
Final Peace Accord would be respected.
(Monsanto, 2013) Below in Chapter (iv) I will elaborate on the evolution
of the main components of the Final Peace Accord.
In other regard, the Final
Peace Accord also incorporated several partial agreements that had been reached
throughout the negotiation. One of them was the partial agreement whereby the
parties agreed on the reincorporation of the combatants to civil and political
life, namely the Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. According to such partial agreement, the
process or integrating members URNG would operate as follows:
2. The process of integrating members of URNG shall begin with the
signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace and shall lead to their
lasting integration into the civil life of the country. The integration process
shall be divided into two phases: an initial integration phase, which shall
last one calendar year starting on D+60, and a subsequent, definitive
integration phase, for the medium term, in which the support required to
consolidate the process will be provided. (Agreement on the Basis for the Legal
Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)
This partial agreement
detailed how reincorporation of URNG rebels would come into effect in different
areas: economic, political, civil, legal, etc. The outcome of this agreement
will be assessed in Chapter (iv) below.
Finally, it is also
noteworthy that the Final Peace Accord included some articles that were meant
to promote the creation of a more just and equitable society. However, such
articles are somewhat abstract and evince that the negotiating force of the
URNG at that point of the conversations was at a low level. (Acuerdo de Paz
Firme y Duradera, 1996)
(iv)
Aftermath of the civil war
and compliance of the agreements
Many former URNG rebels as
well as government officers that negotiated the partial agreements and the
Final Peace Accord in the 1990s believe that many agreements have not been
fully enforced. Below, an assessment of the enforcement and compliance of the
agreements that I consider more relevant is presented, particularly those
dealing with indigenous rights; truth and reparation; justice reform;
democratization and reintegration into civil and political life of rebels; economic
reform and the land problem; and legal reform.
iv.1. Indigenous Rights
More than 50% of
Guatemalans are indigenous. However, they have historically been subject to all
sorts of discrimination. Therefore, the Agreement on Identity and Rights of
Indigenous Peoples was an enormous leap in the process of improving their
recognition as citizens and their right against all forms of discrimination.
The Agreement says:
To overcome the age-old discrimination against indigenous peoples the
assistance of all citizens will be needed in the effort to change thinking,
attitudes and behaviour. This change must begin with a clear recognition by all
Guatemalans of the reality of racial discrimination and of the compelling need
to overcome it and achieve true peaceful coexistence.
Unfortunately, in spite of the
recognition of the Agreement that Guatemala is a “multiethnic, multicultural,
and multilingual nation”, where discrimination should be suppressed, the truth
is that discrimination continues, particularly due to the lack of will of the
governing elite. According to the Conclusions of the International Conference
of the European Parliament that met in May 2 and 3 of 2007 with the purpose of
evaluating the compliance of the Guatemala Peace Accords “progress in the
compliance of the Accords has been minimal. There are large and persistent obstacles
to the realization of indigenous rights”. (European Parliament, 2007)
The situation of poverty, social exclusion and discrimination faced by
Guatemala’s indigenous peoples has not changed substantially. In this respect,
there has been a very low level of compliance with this Accord. Although there
has been progress with respect to cultural rights, the problems of access to
land, legal security and the rights of indigenous peoples remain unresolved.
(European Parliament, 2007)
Taking into account the
above, it may be argued that cultural violence – as defined by Galtung, 1990 –
remains:
By 'cultural violence' we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic
sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and
art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be
used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. (Galtung, 1990)
Also, it may be argued that
structural violence remains. Marginalization and fragmentation of indigenous
communities is the common place. The lack of access to education, health, land
and food is the general rule, in a country where indigenous communities remain
in extreme poverty. Thus, it is possible to conclude that in spite of some
progress made in the field of legal recognition, de facto discrimination continues to be the general rule. Also, it
may be argued that the peace reached in Guatemala is at least fragile, if we
are to accept that many of the grievances that led to the conflict still
remain. (Ohlson, 2008)
iv.2. Truth and Reparation
As noted above in Chapter
(iii), the rights of the victims to know the truth and to be fully repaired
were not fulfilled. Some progress was made but it did not reach the needs of
the post-conflict era. The Report of the Truth Commission (Comisión para el
Esclarecimiento Histórico), the exhumation and identification of myriads of
corpses of victims of the war, and also some initiatives to create registries
of victims and to regulate access to public documents and archives, were
significant yet insufficient efforts. (Impunity Watch) Hundreds of victims
still wait to know the truth of what happened to their siblings, parents or
children; hundreds of them still wait to be repaired. (Sandoval, 2013)
However, as Keira Goldstein
asserts, in the “aftermath of atrocities it was once common to sacrifice
justice for peace”. She explains that criminal prosecutions were seen as situations
that could put at risk fragile peace accords. As an example, the author
mentions the case of Uruguay, were voters upheld an amnesty for officers who
had committed human rights violations. People feared that prosecutions against
those military officers would result in a return to a military dictatorship. (Goldstein,
2006)
Thus, the interaction
between justice and peace might be better described as a trade-off: peace
versus justice. Goldstein believes that a middle point to that dichotomy may be
found in modern peace negotiations, where some level of impunity is granted in
exchange for some level of truth and punishment. However, she still
acknowledges the fact that in occasions, trying to purge a complete army would
put at risk the need of achieving peace. (Goldstein, 2006)
It is important to have
this in mind, as putting an end to some of the longest civil wars requires some
level of impunity. Punishment is not necessarily the best or only way to end a conflict.
Thus, it is at least arguable the assertion of those who define the Guatemalan peace
process as a failure because many of the perpetrators of human rights
violations have not been tried. The debate, however, is no an easy one. After
all, the conflict left 200,000 people dead and the Truth Commission found that
acts of genocide were committed by the state against indigenous Mayan people
between 1982 and 1983. (Rohter, 1999)
iii.3. Justice reform
According to Aldana, 2012,
some important reforms were made on the administration of justice system beginning
in 1994, two years before the Final Peace Accord was signed, but after the Comprehensive
Human Rights Agreement was reached in March 29, 1994. That year, the criminal
justice system adopted an adversarial model, which modified the role of the
prosecutor and police along the investigations while simultaneously expanding
the role of the victims in them. Moreover, Guatemala established in its Constitution
that common crimes perpetrated by the military should be tried by civil-courts.
(Aldana, 2012)
Later, in 1996, the Penal
Code was modified, including the crime of “forceful disappearance”, thus
expanding criminal liability beyond the crime of “kidnapping”. Interestingly
enough, in 2009 the Constitutional Court found – in a groundbreaking ruling – that
the forceful disappearance crime was an “ongoing crime”, therefore allowing the
application of the amended 1996 Penal Code to the forced disappearances
perpetrated during the civil war! Some years after, in 2005, Guatemala created
a Human Right Unit to prosecute the cases occurred during the war. (Aldana,
2012)
Finally, in 2006, with aid
provided by the World Bank and United Nations (UNOPS), a project aimed at the
modernization of the legal tracking systems of the judiciary of Guatemala was
implemented. Such project helped to keep better track of the cases, judicial
decisions, prisoners and frozen assets of criminals.
In spite of the progress,
still much more remained to be done. The judicial system is extremely slow,
backlog of files is the common rule in all types of courts, and corruption is
extremely high. (Impunity Watch) According to Impunity Watch 2010 report:
In the research prepared by IW it was apparent that the fields where
less progress exists are access to justice and depuration of state institutions.
Based on the obstacles identified by the research, IW recommends that the
institutions of the state, particularly the Prosecutors Office, the Police and
the Administrative Branch of the Judiciary, adopt necessary measures and
strategies to fulfill with their mission. (Impunity Watch, 2010)
In conclusion, the Final
Peace Agreement did help to transform the judicial system of Guatemala yet the
efforts made until know still prove weak.
iv.4. Reincorporation of the URNG in the civil and political life
The reincorporation of the
URNG in the civil and political life of Guatemala proved to be full of
obstacles. Regarding the reincorporation to civil life, such process was particularly
tough as many combatants had left their homes, families and jobs during many
years, and all of a sudden had to restart their lives from scratch, as real
strangers even to their own families. They also found several difficulties in
finding decent jobs, in the urban or rural areas.
Regarding the incorporation
to political life, URNG found difficulties in order to transform its military
power into political organization and electoral capacity. According to
Goldstein:
The agreement specifies how political spaces are to be kept open.
Broadly speaking, in the UN mediated peace process, groups “once excluded and
repressed received new rights, legal recognition, and access to the legal
political arena, among them the indigenous peoples and former revolutionaries
of the URNG. (Goldstein, 2006)
The truth is, however, that
URNG political inexperience, the effort of its leaders to assure the compliance
of the Final Peace Accord by the military and COPAZ, and the lack of an
economic safety net led the demobilized rebels toward a complete failure in the
political arena.
Thus, after the Final Peace
Accord was signed, contrary to what happened with the FMLN in El Salvador, where
such group recently reached the Presidency, the URNG rapidly lost influence in the
political life of Guatemala. David Holiday suggest that “while making it the
third political force in Congress and offering an important venue for
participation, nevertheless essentially (the URNG) translated its military
defeat into political defeat”. (Holiday, 2000)
iii.5. Economic reform and the land problem
In furtherance of the Accord
on Socio-Economic Aspects and the Land Problem, some progress has been made in
different fronts during the years following 1996. Goldstein explains that
during the peace negotiations, multilateral institutions such as the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund
were in close contact with the mediators. After the experiences of Nicaragua and
El Salvador, those institutions, aware of the risks of fast liberalization,
pressed simultaneously for reforms that endorsed free market but also committed
the national government to increase the levels of social welfare investment. (Goldstein,
2006)
Somehow and against all
odds, the financial institutions came to view a reduction in Guatemala’s socio-economic
inequalities as a requisite for a lasting peace. Nevertheless, the full
compliance of the Accord on Socio-Economic Aspects and the Land Problem has
confronted several obstacles, particularly regarding the land problem.
According to the European Parliament the main problems for the implementation
of the agreement have been the lack of access to production resources and the
increasing level of land conflicts. Also the land ownership system and the
scarce access to cultivable lands, added to the concentration of land in fewer
hands, remain the epicenter of the land conflict. (European Parliament, 2007)
In addition, land ownership
structure is directly linked to extreme poverty and malnutrition of the
indigenous population, one of the most horrific forms of structural violence ongoing
in Guatemala. (Galtung, 1990) Moreover, the lands that were purchased or
awarded in the past through the Land Fund have been subdivided into smaller
plots, thus generating insurmountable productivity obstacles that derive in the
purchase of those small parcels by historical landowners.
Finally, it is apparent that
there is no consistent national rural development policy. In the past European
cooperation entities provided technical and financial support in major rural
development projects, but not any longer. The withdrawal of those entities from
Guatemala has left a vacuum that has not been filled by state agencies yet.
(European Parliament, 2007)
iii.6. Legal reform
As of May 16, 1999,
Guatemalan citizens voted for the approval – or rejection – of 50 constitutional
reforms necessary for the fulfillment of the Final Peace Accord. Surprisingly,
the referendum failed to reach the
approval of voters, an event that would have ratified and institutionalized the
changes that the peace process had made apparent that were needed. (Holiday,
2000)
Whereas at least four
million citizens had the right to vote only 758,000 persons did so, this is
18.5% of the electoral census. Moreover, the majority of those who voted did so
against the Final Peace Accord signed by the government and URNG. 55% of voters
said “no”, while only 44% voted “yes”. Only 1% of the votes were void or blank.
Apparently voters were easily misguided by black-propaganda campaigns promoted
by extreme right-wing groups that called citizens to vote against the referendum, as well as by evangelic pastors
that threatened to expel their followers from the religion if they voted “yes”.
(Kyenyke, 2013)
The question that had a
higher number of negative votes was the one that referred to a new definition
of Guatemala as a “solidary, multicultural, plurilingual and multiethnic”
nation. Only in the provinces of the North and West, which had more brutally
suffered the war, an affirmative vote prevailed. (Kyenyke, 2013)
It is therefore evident
that the participation of the civil society in the Guatemalan peace process did
not assure that the accords reached by the conflicting parties would be
ratified by referendum. It is also
clear that the legal reforms that the country needed for fulfilling the peace
agreements got stalled due to failed referendum, thus leaving URNG in a
difficult situation. It had reached an agreement, left arms and demobilized,
but the legal reforms needed to enforce what had been agreed failed to succeed.
(v)
Conclusions and lessons for
the Colombian case
The peace process between URNG
and COPAZ in Guatemala leaves the following conclusions and lessons for the
Colombian negotiations currently held between FARC rebels and the Colombian
government:
1. Peace negotiations may take
longer than the public opinion and the press expects. In Guatemala the
negotiations took nearly 5 years and in El Salvador 3. Thus, the Colombian government
and citizens must not despair at this point of negotiation, after a whole year
of peace talks has passed. It is simply unrealistic to expect a final peace
agreement to be reached before the June, 2014, Presidential elections.
2. It is also unrealistic to
expect rebels to agree on a cease-fire during the initial or middle part of
peace negotiations. For them, as well as for the government, putting military
pressure on the other part is a rational way of improving each side`s
negotiating power. Moreover, it is clear that achieving higher commitments of
the state for social, political and democratic reform requires rebels to keep
military pressure on the government until such commitments are made and
ratified.
3. The intervention of an
impartial moderator may be a good way to overcome phases where the negotiations
seem to stall. In Guatemala, the UN played such important role after 1994. In
Colombia, such a moment may occur during the discussion of the last points of
the negotiation agenda, which might prove to be the most challenging.
Therefore, it could be useful for both parties to anticipate such moment and
agree on choosing such a moderator if needed.
4. The involvement of foreign
actors is sometimes useful to create an adequate climate for beginning peace
negotiations, such as the Esquipulas I
and Esquipulas II meetings demonstrated.
In the Colombian case, Cuba and Venezuela have played an important role in
helping to create such environment. Also, the Norwegian involvement has helped
to create trust between the parties, leading to the initiation of peace talks
in La Habana more that a year ago.
5. The involvement of the
civil society in the peace talks is a double-edged sword. While it may help to legitimate
the final agreements reached by the parties, it does not assure by itself that
the accord will be ratified, just as the Guatemalan referendum results evinced in 1999.
6. Further, the involvement of
the civil society in the peace talks may help rebels to increase their
political power at the domestic level; to open additional dialogue spaces with
different groups of society; to overcome their traditional isolation; and finally,
it may be used for harming the government`s reputation and simultaneously to
legitimize their armed struggle.
7. Achieving partial
agreements is a good way of making safe progress throughout peace negotiations.
The peace-talks of El Salvador and Guatemala are good examples of this. Also,
it is noteworthy that the current negotiations being held between the Colombian
government and FARC rebels seem to be advancing properly, in part due to the smart
negotiation agenda that was agreed, which aims to make partial agreements
before reaching a Final Peace Accord.
8. Reincorporation to civil
and political life of the rebels needs to have proper attention. Failure to
negotiate this key part of the peace talks properly may leave former rebels in
extreme hardship after the war is over. That hardship necessarily impacts their
capacity to endeavor to political activism.
9. Thus, the parties should
increase efforts to guarantee the capacity of former rebels to reintegrate to
an economic and productive life, as well as to overcome moral and psychological
problems faced after the end of the war. Finally, measures should be taken in
order to assure that the organization will be able to transform successfully
into a political force with real option to win democratic elections.
10. Finally, both parties to
the negotiation should take advantage of international actors, such as
international organizations and countries, to obtain the economic aid required
to implement the agreements, particularly those relative to the land reform,
which are generally extremely costly and of difficult execution. This is
particularly important for the Colombian case, where the Land Reform was the
first accord reached by the parties in 2013.
camiloencisov@yahoo.com
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