11 de noviembre de 200
Introduction
This paper addresses the morality or immorality underlying crimes perpetrated by young combatants (YCs) under mortal duress. The conclusions of such an inquiry may be useful in justifying specific agreements entered into by states and combatants involved in armed conflicts within the scope of transitional justice proceedings (TJP). Although it is true that every TJP has specific characteristics, which vary depending on the particularities of each armed conflict, it is true that the great majority of them in many cases are confronted with the issue of defining the extent of YCs’ criminal and moral liability.
Addressing this problem from a moral perspective can contribute to the advancement of TJP by introducing moral arguments as rationales pursuant to the adoption of normative decisions. It can also help to heal the wounds inflicted by armed conflicts which need much more than the execution and enforcement of TJP regulations.[1] A moral explanation of the motives which compelled the combatants to act in one way or another is needed. If such motives give strong reasons for having perpetrated crimes, the society as a whole would be arguably more inclined to forgive the agents for their wrongdoing.
This paper is divided into three parts. First, I present a general overview of how minors usually get involved in armed conflicts, of how they are recruited by illegal armed forces under conditions of duress, and how moral excuses derived from duress and ignorance interact with each other. Second, I elaborate on free will and on some plausible assumptions of the psychological implications of forceful involvement into armed conflicts. The argument hereunder presented gives an insight of the deviations of morality under such circumstances, raising new questions: do YCs act with free will? The distortion of morality which the armed conflict creates in YCs may be considered a justification for their killings – which after all derive from an initial situation of duress – ? Third, I raise some final questions and partial conclusions, and highlight some possible threads that academia could undertake in addressing this issue.
I
The task undertaken by this essay consists in assessing the excusable nature of acts under duress in cases of forceful recruitment of minors. Two questions come up in the pursuit of such endeavor: (i) if minors kill and/or commit crimes under duress after forceful recruitment by (illegal) armed groups are their actions morally excusable? (ii) Given the fact that after a period of indoctrination these youths would seem to become enthusiastic militants of such armies, is it possible to assert after a certain period of time that duress still provides a good excuse against moral charges against them?[2]
(i) In connection with the question of the moral excusability of the actions perpetrated by YCs enrolled under conditions of duress, it is useful to understand how this enrollment takes place. During the 1980s Colombia was in the midst of a battle between the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia – Popular Army (FARC), the National Army of Liberation (ELN), on one side, and the national government, drug cartels and Paramilitaries, on the other. One of the strategies feverishly pursued by illegal armed forces was the recruitment of youths.[3] Two main strategies were fostered with that end. The first was the forceful recruitment of youths; the second was the recruitment of youths with the promise of a wage for their enrollment. In this paper I will refer only to the first strategy.
A paradigmatic enrollment would occur as follows: (a) Illegal armed group X takes over town T, formerly under control of armed group Y, (b) 10, 15 or 20 inhabitants of T are killed before the eyes of their distressed families, (c) horrifying tortures are inflicted by X on their victims (citizens of T) before the killing actually takes place, (d) women in T are sexually abused, (e) minors of T between 8 and 18 years old are forced to join X under threat of death, sexual violence, torture or additional injury over themselves or their families, (f) YCs are officially recruited and strongly indoctrinated, (g) along the first years after their enrollment, YCs know that they will be shot if they abandon X (or try to do so), (h) suspects of passing information to X’s enemies or YCs who fall asleep during their surveillance assignments are likely to be shot as well, (i) the commandant of X picks by lottery the person charged of executing the sentence, and (j) a few weeks after their initial recruitment YCs are forced to murder, kidnap, torture, and perform many other kind of atrocities against third parties.
Pursuant to the abovementioned, it is feasible to argue that YCs are not blameworthy for their actions, as they are excused by mortal duress.[4] Asking them to behave in any other way would be to require from them a supererogatory behavior; this is, it would imply that we ask them to bear an extreme burden which average moral persons would not be willing to carry under such condition. If this conclusion is true, we could also argue that all the actions perpetrated in such a situation of duress are justifiable, and subsequently they would not be morally blameworthy, as long as the psychological impact of duress remains and is the efficient cause of the action.[5]
(ii) Here arises the second problem, namely the extent, scope and/or durability of duress as an excuse for the actions perpetrated by such YCs. As the years go by, in many cases YC become enthusiastic members of X.[6] They share and foster X’s values, aims, and convictions, and endeavor subsequently to defend them. The question here would be if these YCs are excusable under a moral standpoint for the crimes perpetrated under this new phase of their enrollment?
In Culpability and Ignorance Gideon Rosen suggests that wrongs perpetrated by agents under situations of ignorance have a complete moral excuse.[7] His archetypical example is the case of a person walking in a public forest, who mistakenly trespasses private property woods under the idea that such territory is part of the public forest. Such a case would constitute factual ignorance. But Rosen also contends that not only factual ignorance is excusable, but also moral ignorance. Thus Rosen is willing to admit that a slave-owner (say in 5 B.C.) is not morally blameworthy, as long as he could not have known that what we was doing was wrong, whereas his particular background, historical context, etc., could not have let him think otherwise. The only condition that Rosen imposes on ignorance as an excuse is that such ignorance cannot derive from the agent’s own decisions, choices, or negligence.[8]
The abovementioned argument can be used successfully in this case, as YCs are recruited under mortal duress; and as such recruitment is not a consequence of the YCs’ own decisions, choices, or negligence, the (moral) ignorance derived from the indoctrination process is a strong moral excuse in their favor. Some logical problems, however, which will be portrayed in chapter II derive from this apparently clear conclusion.
II
Taking into account that free will is the basis of morality (I will admit this as given), it might be useful to elaborate on this concept under this approach: In the midst of the Slamdance Festival in New York a terrifying documentary revealing the war between different paramilitary groups in Medellin, Colombia, was released.[9] One of the most striking scenes of the documentary shows “Pirulo” (P), a 6 or 7 year old boy, handling bullets to his father, who is shooting (and is being shot by) his enemies. The kid repeats once and again: “matalo papá, matalo!”, which means “kill him dad, kill him!”.
The problem that arises here is whether P is free in the moral (and perhaps intellectual) sense. This is: is P acting under free will or are his decisions and behavior the result of social or psychological circumstances? What then, when P grows up? Even though it is possible to admit, as several practical examples evince, that a person born and raised under such harsh conditions could guide his conduct under a “righteous” moral standard, it is more likely to occur that such person P will not be able to understand that what he does is wrong, if, for example, he follows his father’s example[10]. Thus, if P becomes a murderer, a drug trafficker or a paramilitary, we cannot really blame him, whereas he is a product of the general circumstances which have determined who he is and which his values are.
The case of YCs we are treating here is different, whereas their conduct is not determined from the beginning (as with P), but rather in a moment in which they already have some sense of what morality is. But it is similar, altogether, considering that YCs are indoctrinated after an intense brainwash process. As a consequence, on the long term the two cases turn out to be very similar. Both P and YCs should not be blameworthy as they are not guilty for their moral ignorance.
An approximation of how free will functions in these types of cases would be necessary. Harry Frankfurt affirms that “A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise”.[11] In developing his argument Frankfurt introduces this case: “Jones3 was neither stampeded by the threat nor indifferent to it. The threat impressed him, as it would impress any reasonable man, and would have submitted to it wholeheartedly if he had not already made a decision that coincided with the one demanded of him. In fact, however, he performed the action in question on the basis of the decision he had made before the threat was issued.”[12] The case of the YCs, however, is different. The indoctrination process has nullified YCs’ free will. Thus in this case the dilemma related to the existence of alternate possibilities is irrelevant, given the fact that the ignorance of YCs, which determines their decisions (thus nullifying their free will), destroys any possible convincing argument according to which YCs acted pursuant to their own and free made choices.
III
The conclusion stated above constitutes a strong form of (dangerous) determinism whereas we should have to admit that a prevalent “evil standard of morality” would become “moral”, as long as it becomes the prevailing moral standard in a particular society or era, as what could have happened if Nazi Germany had triumphed over the Allies in 1945. If this is true, then the Nazi leaders (N) of the second, third, and so on, generations, could not have been assessed as blameworthy for their killings in concentration camps in Latin America, Africa or Asia, because they would have acted under moral ignorance! This conclusion would allow us to state that morality as we understand it is irrelevant because it relies in politics and in the particular sense of morality of the victorious party and not in moral compelling and objective reasons. Thus, morality (and justice) would simply rely in the will of the strongest.[13] Even though the conclusion of liberating N from blame is entirely logical, still it seems counter intuitive.
The skepticism over such counter intuitive conclusion would lead us to admit that notwithstanding the prevailing “moral” (m) standard of N, strong morality (M) has a hard core set of principles which prevail under any circumstance. The question then would be where to look for such set of principles? Natural law? Reason? Intuition? Once again, this question raises the insoluble debate between positivism, communitarian determinism, and the liberal tradition.
These partial conclusions, however, don’t seem to solve the question of why it seems evident that we should not blame YCs, and on the contrary blame N. Taking this into account, there is no clear reason of why YCs should be considered as non blameworthy in the case described above in I beyond political, policy, or utilitarian reasons. It seems to be that admitting moral ignorance as an excuse would deeply undermine a strong idea of morality, or at least, it would take it to the “moral positivist” arena, thus having to admit that morality simply relies on the enforceability of its (moral) norms.
I believe that further elaboration on this matter should be made in order to clarify (or at least try to do so) the paradoxical conclusions described in this essay, and mainly, in order to explain which are the particular circumstances which differentiate the case of N from the case of YCs. In short, this would imply to understand where resides the ultima ratio of morality in societies and political compacts which have historically suffered (or could suffer) a massive shift toward an “evil standard of morality”. Doing so, would also help us to give final answers to the question of what to do with YCs in the midst of TJPs, depending on the moral responsibility, or the lack of it, of said YCs.
IV
Etiene de la Boite wrote an essay on human bondage in ( ) Century. Botie’s argument was that … (P. 7 of Paternalism and Perfectionism) The Politics of Obedience:The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude
P. 25 Slaves. Buckley/
BIBLIOGRAPHY
TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford University Press. 2000.
Defensoría del Pueblo, "El Conflicto Armado en Colombia y los menores de edad," Boletín No. 2, Santafé de Bogotá, May 1996.ROSEN, Gideon. Responsibility and Mortal Duress. July 2009. Non published work.
ARISTOTLE. Nichomachean Ethics. Book VI. Chapter 2. Gredos.
ROSEN, Gideon. Culpability and Ignorance. Non published work.
DALTON, Scott and MARTINEZ, Margarita. La Sierra. Documentary.
FRANKFURT, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23 (Dec. 4, 1969).
PLATO. The Republic. Dialogue with Trasimacus. Book 1. Gredos.
[1] TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford University Press. 2000. P. 4.
[2] This issue could also be studied under a different approach, this is: what is the (moral) impact of time over duress?[3] Defensoría del Pueblo, "El Conflicto Armado en Colombia y los menores de edad," Boletín No. 2, Santafé de Bogotá, May 1996.[4] ROSEN, Gideon. Responsibility and Mortal Duress. July 2009. Non published work. P. 2.
[5] ARISTOTLE. Nichomachean Ethics. Book VI. Chapter 2. Gredos.
[6] For practical reasons I will assume that YC who don’t are covered by the excuse of duress until the last moment of their forceful recruitment.
[7] ROSEN, Gideon. Culpability and Ignorance. Non published work. P. 61.
[8] ROSEN. Ibid. P. 63.
[9] DALTON, Scott and MARTINEZ, Margarita. La Sierra. La Sierra is a dreadful documentary which displays the violence in Medellin during the 90s and first decade of 21st century, portraying the involvement of youths in Colombian armed conflict, as well as the connection with children under 10. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqbmAPSMDRE
[10] Even more, when it seems to be a fact of human nature that people are inclined to admit that ones own parents stand for a paradigm of moral integrity, whatsoever that integrity is formed of.
[11] FRANKFURT, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23 (Dec. 4, 1969). P. 829. According to Frankfurt: “This principle (the principle of alternate possibilities) states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise”.
[12] FRANKFURT, Harry. Ibidem. P. 832.
[13] PLATO. The Republic. Dialogue with Trasimacus. Book 1. Gredos.
This paper addresses the morality or immorality underlying crimes perpetrated by young combatants (YCs) under mortal duress. The conclusions of such an inquiry may be useful in justifying specific agreements entered into by states and combatants involved in armed conflicts within the scope of transitional justice proceedings (TJP). Although it is true that every TJP has specific characteristics, which vary depending on the particularities of each armed conflict, it is true that the great majority of them in many cases are confronted with the issue of defining the extent of YCs’ criminal and moral liability.
Addressing this problem from a moral perspective can contribute to the advancement of TJP by introducing moral arguments as rationales pursuant to the adoption of normative decisions. It can also help to heal the wounds inflicted by armed conflicts which need much more than the execution and enforcement of TJP regulations.[1] A moral explanation of the motives which compelled the combatants to act in one way or another is needed. If such motives give strong reasons for having perpetrated crimes, the society as a whole would be arguably more inclined to forgive the agents for their wrongdoing.
This paper is divided into three parts. First, I present a general overview of how minors usually get involved in armed conflicts, of how they are recruited by illegal armed forces under conditions of duress, and how moral excuses derived from duress and ignorance interact with each other. Second, I elaborate on free will and on some plausible assumptions of the psychological implications of forceful involvement into armed conflicts. The argument hereunder presented gives an insight of the deviations of morality under such circumstances, raising new questions: do YCs act with free will? The distortion of morality which the armed conflict creates in YCs may be considered a justification for their killings – which after all derive from an initial situation of duress – ? Third, I raise some final questions and partial conclusions, and highlight some possible threads that academia could undertake in addressing this issue.
I
The task undertaken by this essay consists in assessing the excusable nature of acts under duress in cases of forceful recruitment of minors. Two questions come up in the pursuit of such endeavor: (i) if minors kill and/or commit crimes under duress after forceful recruitment by (illegal) armed groups are their actions morally excusable? (ii) Given the fact that after a period of indoctrination these youths would seem to become enthusiastic militants of such armies, is it possible to assert after a certain period of time that duress still provides a good excuse against moral charges against them?[2]
(i) In connection with the question of the moral excusability of the actions perpetrated by YCs enrolled under conditions of duress, it is useful to understand how this enrollment takes place. During the 1980s Colombia was in the midst of a battle between the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia – Popular Army (FARC), the National Army of Liberation (ELN), on one side, and the national government, drug cartels and Paramilitaries, on the other. One of the strategies feverishly pursued by illegal armed forces was the recruitment of youths.[3] Two main strategies were fostered with that end. The first was the forceful recruitment of youths; the second was the recruitment of youths with the promise of a wage for their enrollment. In this paper I will refer only to the first strategy.
A paradigmatic enrollment would occur as follows: (a) Illegal armed group X takes over town T, formerly under control of armed group Y, (b) 10, 15 or 20 inhabitants of T are killed before the eyes of their distressed families, (c) horrifying tortures are inflicted by X on their victims (citizens of T) before the killing actually takes place, (d) women in T are sexually abused, (e) minors of T between 8 and 18 years old are forced to join X under threat of death, sexual violence, torture or additional injury over themselves or their families, (f) YCs are officially recruited and strongly indoctrinated, (g) along the first years after their enrollment, YCs know that they will be shot if they abandon X (or try to do so), (h) suspects of passing information to X’s enemies or YCs who fall asleep during their surveillance assignments are likely to be shot as well, (i) the commandant of X picks by lottery the person charged of executing the sentence, and (j) a few weeks after their initial recruitment YCs are forced to murder, kidnap, torture, and perform many other kind of atrocities against third parties.
Pursuant to the abovementioned, it is feasible to argue that YCs are not blameworthy for their actions, as they are excused by mortal duress.[4] Asking them to behave in any other way would be to require from them a supererogatory behavior; this is, it would imply that we ask them to bear an extreme burden which average moral persons would not be willing to carry under such condition. If this conclusion is true, we could also argue that all the actions perpetrated in such a situation of duress are justifiable, and subsequently they would not be morally blameworthy, as long as the psychological impact of duress remains and is the efficient cause of the action.[5]
(ii) Here arises the second problem, namely the extent, scope and/or durability of duress as an excuse for the actions perpetrated by such YCs. As the years go by, in many cases YC become enthusiastic members of X.[6] They share and foster X’s values, aims, and convictions, and endeavor subsequently to defend them. The question here would be if these YCs are excusable under a moral standpoint for the crimes perpetrated under this new phase of their enrollment?
In Culpability and Ignorance Gideon Rosen suggests that wrongs perpetrated by agents under situations of ignorance have a complete moral excuse.[7] His archetypical example is the case of a person walking in a public forest, who mistakenly trespasses private property woods under the idea that such territory is part of the public forest. Such a case would constitute factual ignorance. But Rosen also contends that not only factual ignorance is excusable, but also moral ignorance. Thus Rosen is willing to admit that a slave-owner (say in 5 B.C.) is not morally blameworthy, as long as he could not have known that what we was doing was wrong, whereas his particular background, historical context, etc., could not have let him think otherwise. The only condition that Rosen imposes on ignorance as an excuse is that such ignorance cannot derive from the agent’s own decisions, choices, or negligence.[8]
The abovementioned argument can be used successfully in this case, as YCs are recruited under mortal duress; and as such recruitment is not a consequence of the YCs’ own decisions, choices, or negligence, the (moral) ignorance derived from the indoctrination process is a strong moral excuse in their favor. Some logical problems, however, which will be portrayed in chapter II derive from this apparently clear conclusion.
II
Taking into account that free will is the basis of morality (I will admit this as given), it might be useful to elaborate on this concept under this approach: In the midst of the Slamdance Festival in New York a terrifying documentary revealing the war between different paramilitary groups in Medellin, Colombia, was released.[9] One of the most striking scenes of the documentary shows “Pirulo” (P), a 6 or 7 year old boy, handling bullets to his father, who is shooting (and is being shot by) his enemies. The kid repeats once and again: “matalo papá, matalo!”, which means “kill him dad, kill him!”.
The problem that arises here is whether P is free in the moral (and perhaps intellectual) sense. This is: is P acting under free will or are his decisions and behavior the result of social or psychological circumstances? What then, when P grows up? Even though it is possible to admit, as several practical examples evince, that a person born and raised under such harsh conditions could guide his conduct under a “righteous” moral standard, it is more likely to occur that such person P will not be able to understand that what he does is wrong, if, for example, he follows his father’s example[10]. Thus, if P becomes a murderer, a drug trafficker or a paramilitary, we cannot really blame him, whereas he is a product of the general circumstances which have determined who he is and which his values are.
The case of YCs we are treating here is different, whereas their conduct is not determined from the beginning (as with P), but rather in a moment in which they already have some sense of what morality is. But it is similar, altogether, considering that YCs are indoctrinated after an intense brainwash process. As a consequence, on the long term the two cases turn out to be very similar. Both P and YCs should not be blameworthy as they are not guilty for their moral ignorance.
An approximation of how free will functions in these types of cases would be necessary. Harry Frankfurt affirms that “A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise”.[11] In developing his argument Frankfurt introduces this case: “Jones3 was neither stampeded by the threat nor indifferent to it. The threat impressed him, as it would impress any reasonable man, and would have submitted to it wholeheartedly if he had not already made a decision that coincided with the one demanded of him. In fact, however, he performed the action in question on the basis of the decision he had made before the threat was issued.”[12] The case of the YCs, however, is different. The indoctrination process has nullified YCs’ free will. Thus in this case the dilemma related to the existence of alternate possibilities is irrelevant, given the fact that the ignorance of YCs, which determines their decisions (thus nullifying their free will), destroys any possible convincing argument according to which YCs acted pursuant to their own and free made choices.
III
The conclusion stated above constitutes a strong form of (dangerous) determinism whereas we should have to admit that a prevalent “evil standard of morality” would become “moral”, as long as it becomes the prevailing moral standard in a particular society or era, as what could have happened if Nazi Germany had triumphed over the Allies in 1945. If this is true, then the Nazi leaders (N) of the second, third, and so on, generations, could not have been assessed as blameworthy for their killings in concentration camps in Latin America, Africa or Asia, because they would have acted under moral ignorance! This conclusion would allow us to state that morality as we understand it is irrelevant because it relies in politics and in the particular sense of morality of the victorious party and not in moral compelling and objective reasons. Thus, morality (and justice) would simply rely in the will of the strongest.[13] Even though the conclusion of liberating N from blame is entirely logical, still it seems counter intuitive.
The skepticism over such counter intuitive conclusion would lead us to admit that notwithstanding the prevailing “moral” (m) standard of N, strong morality (M) has a hard core set of principles which prevail under any circumstance. The question then would be where to look for such set of principles? Natural law? Reason? Intuition? Once again, this question raises the insoluble debate between positivism, communitarian determinism, and the liberal tradition.
These partial conclusions, however, don’t seem to solve the question of why it seems evident that we should not blame YCs, and on the contrary blame N. Taking this into account, there is no clear reason of why YCs should be considered as non blameworthy in the case described above in I beyond political, policy, or utilitarian reasons. It seems to be that admitting moral ignorance as an excuse would deeply undermine a strong idea of morality, or at least, it would take it to the “moral positivist” arena, thus having to admit that morality simply relies on the enforceability of its (moral) norms.
I believe that further elaboration on this matter should be made in order to clarify (or at least try to do so) the paradoxical conclusions described in this essay, and mainly, in order to explain which are the particular circumstances which differentiate the case of N from the case of YCs. In short, this would imply to understand where resides the ultima ratio of morality in societies and political compacts which have historically suffered (or could suffer) a massive shift toward an “evil standard of morality”. Doing so, would also help us to give final answers to the question of what to do with YCs in the midst of TJPs, depending on the moral responsibility, or the lack of it, of said YCs.
IV
Etiene de la Boite wrote an essay on human bondage in ( ) Century. Botie’s argument was that … (P. 7 of Paternalism and Perfectionism) The Politics of Obedience:The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude
P. 25 Slaves. Buckley/
BIBLIOGRAPHY
TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford University Press. 2000.
Defensoría del Pueblo, "El Conflicto Armado en Colombia y los menores de edad," Boletín No. 2, Santafé de Bogotá, May 1996.ROSEN, Gideon. Responsibility and Mortal Duress. July 2009. Non published work.
ARISTOTLE. Nichomachean Ethics. Book VI. Chapter 2. Gredos.
ROSEN, Gideon. Culpability and Ignorance. Non published work.
DALTON, Scott and MARTINEZ, Margarita. La Sierra. Documentary.
FRANKFURT, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23 (Dec. 4, 1969).
PLATO. The Republic. Dialogue with Trasimacus. Book 1. Gredos.
[1] TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford University Press. 2000. P. 4.
[2] This issue could also be studied under a different approach, this is: what is the (moral) impact of time over duress?[3] Defensoría del Pueblo, "El Conflicto Armado en Colombia y los menores de edad," Boletín No. 2, Santafé de Bogotá, May 1996.[4] ROSEN, Gideon. Responsibility and Mortal Duress. July 2009. Non published work. P. 2.
[5] ARISTOTLE. Nichomachean Ethics. Book VI. Chapter 2. Gredos.
[6] For practical reasons I will assume that YC who don’t are covered by the excuse of duress until the last moment of their forceful recruitment.
[7] ROSEN, Gideon. Culpability and Ignorance. Non published work. P. 61.
[8] ROSEN. Ibid. P. 63.
[9] DALTON, Scott and MARTINEZ, Margarita. La Sierra. La Sierra is a dreadful documentary which displays the violence in Medellin during the 90s and first decade of 21st century, portraying the involvement of youths in Colombian armed conflict, as well as the connection with children under 10. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqbmAPSMDRE
[10] Even more, when it seems to be a fact of human nature that people are inclined to admit that ones own parents stand for a paradigm of moral integrity, whatsoever that integrity is formed of.
[11] FRANKFURT, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23 (Dec. 4, 1969). P. 829. According to Frankfurt: “This principle (the principle of alternate possibilities) states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise”.
[12] FRANKFURT, Harry. Ibidem. P. 832.
[13] PLATO. The Republic. Dialogue with Trasimacus. Book 1. Gredos.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario